

BLOCKING THE PATH



**THE ANTI-REFORM VOTERS
STANDING BETWEEN
FARAGE AND NUMBER 10**

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About the Polling and Insights Unit

The HOPE not hate Polling and Insights Unit analyses public opinion on the far right and the wider issues that drive its rise. Our aim is for ourselves and the progressive sector as a whole to be driven by an accurate understanding of what people think, why they think it, and what will change minds and move people to act. We produce regular insight pieces and longer reports that inform strategy, policy and campaign development.



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Executive Summary

43% of the British public say they would be unhappy with a Reform UK government, but until recently, it has been the most likely outcome of the next general election.

Our study of 8,617 **anti-Reform voters** who would be unhappy with a Reform government reveals that they are not a coherent bloc. Instead, they are a coalition defined by suspicion of Reform's ideological agenda and/or its ability to deliver.

Our task is to understand why Reform deters these voters, what their current political preferences are and where they are situated across the electoral map. As Reform continues to be a legitimate electoral threat, we need a clear understanding of who can be targeted and coordinated to provide a strong electoral opposition. Reaching voters on the issues that matter to them, and not patronising them with moralising, will be essential.

Opposition to Reform UK

Two thirds of anti-Reform voters believe that Reform's views are too extreme, with just 3% thinking the party's views fall legitimately within normal debate. 91% of anti-Reform voters have a negative opinion of Nigel Farage.

Although immigration is Reform's flagship policy area, anti-Reform voters are most concerned by the prospect of Nigel Farage as Prime Minister, the impact on the NHS, health and social care and the consequences for the cost of living and the economy. Considering that there are anti-Reform voters who also hold anti-immigration views, Farage's unpopularity and the risk a Reform government poses to the economy and household budgets are promising lines of critique.

Segmentation

Being anti-Reform is not synonymous with being progressive, and voters differ on more than the traditional social and economic left-right axes. Amongst the issues that divide the anti-Reform coalition are institutional trust, attitudes to economic justice, support for climate action and even immigration and multiculturalism. A sizeable proportion of the anti-Reform coalition is concerned about immigration and ambivalent about left-wing economic policies like wealth tax and nationalisation.

There is evidence of political volatility and party switching across all five segments, suggesting that political parties have lots to gain by understanding and attempting to reach these groups. For those

Agitated Activists

Passionate and impatient for radical left-wing change, but distrustful of whether mainstream political institutions can deliver.

6%

14%

Pragmatic Progressives

Left-leaning and values driven, but worn down by economic realities.

30%

Disaffected Right

Similar in some ways to Reform voters, but driven away from Reform by precarity and intense scepticism.

20%

Hopeful Left

Progressive and optimistic: the anti-Reform voter who believes in the system and wants an open-hearted society.

Comfortable Moderates

Settled and conflict averse: on the fence on culture wars, but decisively right-wing on the economy.

interested in targeting tactical voters, we can reach them on the issues that most passionately concern them about Reform.

Tactical voting and the next general election

For anti-Reform tactical voting to take place at the next general election, voters need clear information about which party is best-placed to beat Reform. In addition to understanding who to support, voters might also need to feel that there is a national risk of Reform forming a government, and that the tactical challenger is different enough from Reform to justify abandoning their actual preference.

Using our latest constituency MRP voting intention projections, there are **463** seats where Reform is competitive, either coming in first or second place or within 10% of the winner (this captures three-way ties). We narrow this down to identify some of the key battlegrounds for tactical persuasion and coordination:

- **95 constituencies with a projected fragile Reform victory.** These contests have a margin of 3 percentage points for Reform to chase or defend.
- **199 constituencies where there is “anti-Reform jeopardy”:** Reform is currently projected to win, but only because of the anti-Reform vote being split between two or more challengers. In some seats this is due to a three-way tie, in others Reform is far in the lead, but could be beaten by tactical voting.

Evidence from some recent by-elections suggests that anti-Reform jeopardy can decrease as an election date approaches, only if voters are clear on how to coordinate. In other cases, a lack of information and contradictory campaigning has left voters unable to form an opposition to Reform. Each seat will need a bespoke strategy, based on continually updating information on which parties have the best chance of beating Reform, and whether voters are willing to stop the party. This will also require parties to jettison political point-scoring and manipulative campaign tactics such as dodgy data on leaflets and presenting themselves as the only anti-Reform option even if there is only limited evidence of this.

Reaching anti-Reform tactical voters

Amongst the topics that could be framed towards the anti-Reform coalition to encourage their participation in voting as a form of countering the radical right are:

- **Foreign policy.** Anti-Reform voters are concerned about the threats posed by the USA and Russia. Farage’s closeness to Trump and the scandal of ex-Reform Wales leader Nathan Gill taking bribes for making pro-Russia statements in the European Parliament link Reform to these countries, which will be of interest across the coalition.
- **A fairer taxation system.** A wealth tax of 2% on £10 million was the most popular policy we tested, including with a majority of the more right-wing segments. Economic redistribution provides a clear contrast to Reform’s economic policy and appeals to the broad anti-Reform coalition when clearly articulated as targeting only extreme wealth, not high earners.
- **Security for working people.** Aside from the Comfortable Moderates, the anti-Reform coalition is interested in workers’ rights

narratives. In particular, the Pragmatic Progressives represent a large segment of voters open to strengthening protections for workers even if it increases costs.

- **Public service safety nets.** Protecting the NHS is a key priority for anti-Reform voters in the face of a potential Reform government, but this is accompanied by a feeling by some that public services no longer offer value for money. Distinguishing ideological from practical concerns is essential.
- **Defending multicultural Britain.** The Disaffected Right are more likely to think that identifying with another culture makes someone less British and that ethnic minority communities are treated better than the average person in the UK. A clear-eyed defence of multiculturalism, separate from questions of immigration and the economy, draws a clear line between Reform and wider political debate.
- **Resisting the culture wars.** Although the right of the anti-Reform coalition is more divided on issues like feminism and the legacy of the British Empire, there is a clear consensus that abortion should be allowed. Reform’s policy of reversing the decriminalisation of abortion will not land with the overwhelming majority of anti-Reform voters.

The cost of living consideration

The cost of living impacts attitudes to climate and immigration differently: for climate, ideological concerns and economic concerns are largely independent from each other, whereas immigration attitudes are more coherent, with those who are concerned about the impact on public services less likely to support more open immigration policies. This suggests that turning the tide on hostile immigration attitudes means directly addressing material concerns, whereas for climate a clear explanation of how action will not negatively impact prices might be sufficient.

Where we go from here

With the party and leadership struggling, Reform victory is far from inevitable. Yet complacency is not an option, with so many seats unprecedentedly close to call. By looking at a target audience that expands beyond the usual sub-groups of “progressives” or “moveable middle” we can see the full expanse of the electoral picture.

The work to begin now is not selecting the one issue or one party that can reach anti-Reform voters – that will come much closer to an election date. Rather, we should be exploring how different angles of the ecosystem can play their part in building anti-Reform disapproval, and converting this into productive electoral dissent.

Anti-Reform voters


Defining “anti-Reform”

In this research, anti-Reform is used to describe people who would be unhappy with a Reform UK government. Anti-Reform voters are by definition *only* united in their opposition to the populist, radical right party. The UK is split by the prospect of Reform UK forming the next government, but slightly more people are likely to feel unhappy, and also take this position with a much greater degree of intensity.

A third of people in the UK would be very unhappy with a Reform government, and even more would be fairly unhappy (rising to 43% total). If we can strategically harness the concerns of these voters, we can deny Reform their chance of power.

Opposition to a Reform UK government is bigger and more intense than support for it

How would you feel if Reform UK formed the next UK government?



Anti-Reform voters vs. non-Reform voters

Anti-Reform voters are off the fence: we exclude in this research the 17% of people who say they would be neither happy nor unhappy with a Reform government. However, it is important to distinguish the degree of opposition people feel. As we explore in our segmentation, there are voters in the UK who define themselves strongly in relation to their political positioning, and others who are milder in their approach. The latter hold what we define as anti-Reform views, and whilst they might refrain from voting for Reform, this “non-Reform voter” identity might not define them.

Still, it is relatively unusual for a party with such a small track record of incumbency to produce any large degree of opposition from the British public. Mass unhappiness with a party has led voters to electoral coordination before, most recently with an anti-Conservative vote at the 2024 General Election. That was prompted by both recent disillusionment with real political decisions and a deeper-seated awareness of the Conservative brand and ideology, with long shadows cast by historical decisions.

Anti-Reform sentiment is much newer, and potentially more fragile. While obscure far-right microparties have existed and fielded small numbers of candidates since the collapse of the BNP, widespread concern about the rise of the political far right in the UK has grown in recent years directly as a result of Reform’s increasing popularity and apparent legitimacy. There is no recent precedent of political support for, or opposition to, the British far right at this scale. It is therefore up to us to explain to voters what is at stake, and to persuade them to actively oppose Reform rather than holding passive concern. For a brief breakdown of what Reform might enact in government, refer to the appendix.

Reform voters

Demographic differences

When comparing voters who would be unhappy (anti-Reform) or happy (pro-Reform) with a Reform government against those with no strong feelings either way, we find that age and ethnicity predict engagement.¹ Older respondents are more likely to hold strong views about Reform, positive or negative, whereas ethnic minority respondents are significantly less likely to do so.

However, most demographic differences are not significant when comparing anti- and pro-Reform voters directly. The one robust and significant exception is gender: women are 46% more likely to

be anti-Reform than pro-Reform ($p < .001$), a finding that holds even after controlling for age, education, ethnicity and socioeconomic grade. This suggests that gender is a meaningful fault line when it comes to Reform UK.

Reform voters and supporters

HOPE not hate's previous research into people who intend to vote for Reform UK reveals a coalition of voters with very different attitudes on issues including the economy, multiculturalism, workers' rights and climate. Although anti-immigration sentiment is more prevalent across the whole coalition, a considerable proportion of the Reform vote has views that are relatively moderate. Dismissing all Reform voters as racist or far-right is therefore both inaccurate and counterproductive. It does nothing to address the circumstances that have led to mass support for a radical right party, and risks further alienating voters who are crying out for change.

We titled that piece of research *Fed Up and Rolling the Dice* because this reflected the spirit of "why not?" that permeates some of the softer segments of Reform voters. Looking at the anti-Reform coalition, we do not see the same willingness to take a punt on something new, even amongst voters whose concerns about immigration and the economy could point them towards Reform. Pessimism and a lack of belief that change is possible actually seems to be keeping some seemingly right-wing voters away from Reform.

Attitudinal differences

In this research, rather than comparing anti-Reform voters with people who would vote for Reform, we compare them with "pro-Reform voters": people who say they would be happy with a Reform UK government. This expands the base slightly beyond Reform voting intention to include a small percentage of voters for other parties too.


We find that anti-Reform voters are significantly more pessimistic than pro-Reform voters, with two thirds saying they are pessimistic about the future and just 11% saying that younger generations will be better off than theirs (compared to 22% of pro-Reform voters). However, the groups share similar attitudes to politics, with just under a third of each feeling satisfied with the political system and similar levels of mistrust in politicians and the mainstream media. The main political dividing line is the permissibility of violence: pro-Reform voters are significantly more likely than anti-Reform voters to agree that violence can sometimes be necessary to defend a strong belief (39% vs. 24%).

Immigration is another issue that splits the cohorts. When asked about the most important issues facing themselves and their families, anti-Reform voters are notably different to the rest of the UK in their lack of selection of immigration and asylum. Pro-Reform voters are more than three times more likely to select it as a top issue, and even neutral voters who would be neither happy nor unhappy with a Reform government are twice as likely to select it (31%). Anti-Reform voters are significantly more likely to

Anti-Reform voters are significantly more likely to care about cost of living and NHS, whilst pro-Reform voters care about immigration and asylum


Which of the following do you think are the most important issues facing you and your family at this time? Select three.

■ GB population ■ Anti-Reform voters ■ Pro-Reform voters



Compared to most people in the UK, do you think the following groups are generally treated better, worse, or about the same?

■ GB population ■ Anti-Reform voters ■ Pro-Reform voters



select the cost of living and health/NHS as personal priorities, although concern for the economy through taxation can still be seen in the pro-Reform cohort.

Wider evidence of polarisation beyond immigration emerges looking at perceptions of different groups and whether they are treated fairly in society. The divergence is not just about whether some groups are receiving different treatment, but whether the treatment is positive or negative. Pro-Reform voters judge ethnic minorities, Muslims, and people seeking asylum to be treated much better than most people in the UK, whilst anti-Reform voters believe that they are treated much worse. The extent of polarisation of attitudes can be seen by how the GB average hovers around zero despite reflecting strong opposing

views. The poor treatment of Jewish communities in the UK is far less controversial. An interesting exception to this pattern is perceptions of white working class communities, which are flipped around so anti-Reform voters think they receive special treatment, whereas pro-Reform voters think they receive harsh treatment. This appears to mirror “two-tier” narratives which have escalated in use over the last few years.


Voting intention

The party political picture for anti-Reform voters is mixed. Unsurprisingly, traditionally progressive and left-of-centre parties (Labour, Liberal Democrats, Green, SNP and Plaid) are overrepresented. However, there is a similar proportion of Conservative voters

Progressive parties are overrepresented in anti-Reform voter preferences, but there are voters of all stripes who would be happy with a Reform government

If there was a General Election tomorrow which party would you vote for, or would you not vote?

■ Reform UK ■ Labour ■ Liberal Democrats ■ Green Party ■ SNP ■ Plaid Cymru ■ Conservatives
■ Other ■ Don't know / prefer not to say ■ Would not vote



in both the anti-Reform and pro-Reform camps. Potentially promising is that there is a higher proportion of undecided voters in the anti-Reform than the pro-Reform camp: persuading them could be important for close contests.

Looking at anti-Reform voters through the lens of current voting intention alone is insufficient in such a volatile political climate. Many voters have switched allegiances and the increase in tactical voting in the 2024 General Election means that past vote does not necessarily capture ideological alignment. Attitudinal analysis of the anti-Reform vote is helpful for unpicking the most effective ways to reach these voters, which we address in the segmentation later in this report.

Why anti-Reform votes matter

Many voting intention MRP projections have suggested that Reform UK could form a slim majority or be the largest party despite attracting less than a third of national vote share. Of course, this is not dissimilar to Labour's 2024 majority on 33.7% of national vote share. This appears to be changing, with newer polls and MRPs finding support for Reform has dropped, but the party could still deny progressives the option to form a majority coalition.


The first past the post electoral system is at a breaking point, with five major parties in England – alongside nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales – vying for votes. Hyper-marginal contests, in which multiple parties appear to be in the running, are becoming more frequent. This increases choice for voters, but also means that winners are elected on small proportions of the vote. Some voters are driven to use their vote tactically to keep a party like Reform UK out, rather than getting their first preference party in.

The possibility of anti-Reform tactical voting is threatened by the difficulty of establishing who the anti-Reform option would be in different contests. Different attitudinal segments within the anti-Reform coalition are concentrated across constituencies and willing to vote tactically in different ways. A seat-by-seat strategy is essential to avoid making sweeping generalisations about only one party being able to stop Reform: a constructive electoral opposition to Reform UK cuts across the political spectrum, reaching key voters on the issues that matter to them.

NOTES:

1 A weighted multinomial logistic regression with multiple demographic predictors was run using survey weights, with “neither” as the baseline category for the first model. Demographic predictors included age (under 45 vs 45+), gender (male vs female), education (below degree level vs degree and above), ethnicity (white vs ethnic minority), and socioeconomic grade (ABC1 vs C2DE). Results are reported as odds ratios with 95% confidence intervals. All analyses were conducted in R.

The Five Anti-Reform Segments




Our analysis of 8,617 anti-Reform UK voters reveals five distinct groups with different attitudes to a number of social, economic and political factors. The segments vary considerably in size, with the Agitated Activists being five times smaller than the Pragmatic Progressives and Comfortable Moderates. This means that the number of voters represented by the smaller segments will be significantly lower, although they may be concentrated in specific seats.

The factor scores below depict the degree to which each segment scores higher (positive scores) or

lower (negative scores) than the average for the anti-Reform sample as a whole, on each of five dimensions. The mean for our nationally representative sample is also plotted to enable comparison of how the anti-Reform segments relate to each other, and to the rest of Great Britain as a whole.

Each segment differs quite considerably from the GB average and the anti-Reform average in at least one dimension. For a full explanation of the methodology, including the questions that influenced each factor, consult Appendix 2.

How do the anti-Reform segments compare to the GB population?



Agitated Activists (6%)

The Agitated Activists have significantly more left-wing views on immigration, social justice, environmentalism and economic justice than the rest of the anti-Reform sample and the GB population as a whole. They strongly defend these issues even when presented with trade-offs and more moderate options. On economics, they have a highly redistributive perspective, almost unanimously backing a wealth tax. However, they are also characterised by low institutional trust, with high feelings of pessimism – 84% think younger generations will be worse off – and are also willing for a more daring, populist politics with rapid change preferred over gradual reform.

The Agitated Activists segment is by far the smallest, and skews much younger than the others, with almost half of members aged between 18 and 34. It is 58% female. Members of this segment are significantly more likely to be degree educated, with 50% having attended university. This segment is the most likely to be living in privately rented accommodation.

Typical constituency: Brighton Pavilion (15%). This is a constituency defined by a local identity centred around diversity and non-conformity: a young, diverse population, a university and long-standing support for the Green Party.

Current voting intention: This segment is overwhelmingly Green-voting at 64%. There are smaller cores of Labour (12%) and Liberal Democrat (8%) votes, as well as average levels of support for the SNP and Plaid Cymru. There are notably lower levels of people who say they don't know who to vote for or would not vote.

Hopeful Left (14%)

The Hopeful Left are slightly less radically left wing than the Agitated Activists, but still considerably further left than the UK population on issues like multiculturalism and environmentalism. They are willing to make active lifestyle changes for the environment and want the UK to be a global leader on climate change, and they feel that multiculturalism works well in the UK. They are also in favour of economic redistribution, but to a lesser degree than the Agitated Activists.

What really distinguishes the Hopeful Left from the Agitated Activists is the high scoring on the institutional trust factor, which is also significantly higher than the national average. This segment resists populist narratives, and expresses a strong preference for steady change for the better. This segment demographically skews slightly male and slightly older.

Typical constituencies: Sheffield Brightside and Hillsborough (31%), Cambridge (24%). These constituencies have highly educated, institutionally

engaged residents. Cambridge is defined by an academic and student population (alongside acute inequality), whilst Sheffield Brightside has deep roots in the organised labour movement.

Current voting intention: This segment's loyalties are split, with the most popular party being Labour (38%) followed by the Greens (21%) and Liberal Democrats (16%). This segment is statistically significantly more likely than all others to support Labour, and has a lower-than-average proportion of undecided and abstaining voters.

Pragmatic Progressives (30%)

This segment's views are the closest to the average of the anti-Reform voter sample, but left-of-centre compared to national averages. They are left-wing on social and economic justice, multiculturalism and environmentalism. This group also has lower institutional trust, feeling like the state no longer provides in the way it should, but is not as jaded and radical as the Agitated Activists.

This segment is the most likely to think cost of living is one of the most important issues facing the UK today, and strongly supports protections for workers. Importantly, this keen interest in a functioning state is reflected in their attitudes towards immigration and climate which wobble if economic trade-offs are brought in: for example, immigration putting pressure on public services or climate targets being too inflexible to balance with living costs. This segment skews younger and has a much higher proportion of women. Pragmatic Progressives are more likely than other segments (apart from the Agitated Activists) to have a degree.

Typical constituencies: Bristol North East (40%), Tynemouth (40%). These are urban, younger areas with a higher-than-average proportion of university graduates. Centre-left parties frequently do well here.

Current voting intention: The Greens are the most popular party for the segment by a small amount (30% compared to 23% support for Labour), with the Liberal Democrats in third place on 16%. There is higher than average support for the SNP and Plaid Cymru, as well as an average number of undecided voters – 10%.

Comfortable Moderates (30%)

The Comfortable Moderates hold social and cultural views which are slightly to the right of the national average on cultural issues, but significantly to the right on economics. On economics, their attitudes are further to the right than the average for the Conservative Party or Reform UK: around a third think that higher earners pay more than their fair share of tax, and they are also less likely to support workers' rights. There is a higher proportion of people who feel financially comfortable or well-off in this segment, which reflects the lack of

immediate self-interest around cost of living relief. This segment skews older, with a third of members over 65, and is the most gender balanced segment. Comfortable Moderates are also the most likely to identify as Christian, with 52% doing so.

What is notable is that this segment has higher levels of institutional trust, second only to the Hopeful Left and significantly higher than both the national average and the rest of anti-Reform voters. On issues like immigration and social justice, Comfortable Moderates are more cautious in their approach, for example preferring immigration to only be allowed on a restricted basis. On key culture war issues such as Britishness, feminism, abortion and the British Empire, they are much more likely than the other segments to be on the fence and not have strong views.

Alongside the Disaffected Right, this segment has a higher proportion of voters who would be “fairly unhappy” as opposed to “very unhappy” in the result of a Reform Government (29%). This suggests that they are less strident in their anti-Reform views, perhaps opting not to vote for Reform UK but not defining themselves around this.

Typical constituencies: Cannock Chase (50%) and Solihull West and Shirley (50%). These are suburban, owner-occupier communities with older demographics and traditionally centrist/Conservative voting histories.

Current voting intention: Voting intention is most evenly split in this segment, with a three-way tie between the Conservatives (24%), Labour (23%) and the Liberal Democrats (20%). There is considerably lower support for the Green Party. If an election were held tomorrow, 5% of Comfortable Moderates would not vote and 12% are undecided, so there is still a lot to play for with this segment.

Disaffected Right (20%)

This segment is defined by its right-leaning social and economic values as well as its low trust in institutions. Whilst anti-Reform voters lean generally towards the middle class, educated and comfortable, the Disaffected Right are demographically quite distinct. Older people are slightly over-represented in this segment, which is fairly balanced by gender (52% female). Notably, this segment is the least likely to have degree-level qualifications and is more likely than others to be renting from the council or local authority (24%). Their relative precarity is reflected in the fact that this segment is significantly less likely to feel comfortable financially.

On many topics, this segment's views diverge considerably from the average anti-Reform voter and look more like the views of Reform UK voters. This segment is the least comfortable mixing with people of different ethnicities and they are significantly more likely to think that identifying with another culture or nationality makes someone less British.

This segment also has lower support for economic justice, although perhaps driven more by experience than ideology (as is more clearly the case with the Comfortable Moderates). Disaffected Right are the most likely to think that public services no longer provide good value for taxpayers, and the least likely to think that the majority of people receiving welfare support genuinely need it.

Alongside the Comfortable Moderates, this segment has a higher proportion of voters who would be “fairly unhappy” as opposed to “very unhappy” in the result of a Reform Government (26%). This suggests that they are less strident in their anti-Reform views.

Typical constituencies: Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes (46%) and Liverpool Walton (46%). These are older, lower opportunity post-industrial communities experiencing acute deprivation – former Labour strongholds that are increasingly alienated from the party.

Current voting intention: Most notable in this segment are the high levels of apathy: 10% would not vote and 11% are undecided. Party support is low across the board, but distributed more to the centre of the political spectrum, with 20% for the Conservatives, 17% for Labour, 13% for the Liberal Democrats and 12% for the Greens. There is also higher-than-average support for the SNP and Plaid Cymru.

How do the segments map onto political parties?

Anti-Reform work could always be approached from current party voter bases, but this has two central flaws. Firstly, we can't be sure that all non-Reform voters are actually anti-Reform – some people won't vote for Reform themselves, but are neutral to or supportive of the party's aims. Secondly, political support is volatile so far away from a General Election, with party stances also still developing. The below analysis confirms that grouping voters into segments provides a distinct outlook to grouping them based on current voting intention.

Note that for the purposes of illustrating the left and right politically, the X axis for factor scores has been flipped.

A notable split across the left wing is institutional trust: the Green Party/Agitated Activists/Pragmatic Progressives are distinctly lower. These are voters who might have felt optimistic at a Labour government replacing many years of Conservative governments after the 2024 General Election, but have since lost some faith.

Interestingly, the smaller segments – the Agitated Activists and the Hopeful Left – are further to the left on some topics than the average for even Green Party voters. Not all members of a segment intend to vote for the party whose voter base they are most closely aligned with, and this could be for a number

of reasons: discrepancies between the voter base and the party leadership, local seat factors that makes a party or candidate a stronger option in one voter's mind than national averages can represent, or a misconception that a voter would not fit in with the typical party base.


Interestingly, both Labour and the Liberal Democrats occupy a fairly similar space on the chart, suggesting closer overlap in their voting bases than we might have previously seen.

On the right wing, the anti-Reform segments are mostly to the left of the respective parties they most resemble. The Comfortable Moderates differ very little from the average Conservative party voter on social issues, but have considerably higher


institutional trust. This makes sense if we consider that current Conservative voters are people who have actively opted to stay with the party rather than switch to Reform, perhaps seeing Reform as too extreme.

Whilst on average the Disaffected Right are still slightly less right-wing than Reform voters on cultural issues, they have notably lower institutional trust. This is a larger segment which could encompass voters who dislike that Reform is still ultimately part of the political system, and thus untrustworthy or unable to deliver. This segment might end up not voting or supporting independent or fringe political movements, although others might be tactical anti-Reform voters.

Factor scores – Left Wing



Factor scores – Right Wing



Political mobilisation by segment


Agitated Activists

This is an audience of highly engaged, highly motivated voters. Agitated Activists have the highest mean certainty score for voting in a future General Election, averaging 9.4 compared to an anti-Reform average of 8.6. They are politically active outside of voting, with 69% having signed a petition, 50% having shared political content online, and 33% having contacted an elected representative. Agitated Activists are also significantly more likely than other segments to be willing to tactically vote for any party to stop Reform, with an average willingness of 83%. However, there is a real lack of appetite to vote tactically for the Conservatives, with just 48% willing to vote for them even if it meant stopping Reform.

This segment is currently the most politically homogenous, which makes sense due to its small size. In the 2016 EU Referendum, 94% of those who were eligible to vote and can remember who they voted for went Remain. However, due to high support for Labour under Corbyn in 2019, this segment is actually the most likely to have switched party allegiances (excluding those who were too young to vote or abstained). 41% of Agitated Activists have changed their party of preference once and 10% have changed twice.

Despite their electoral engagement, this segment is politically jaded – 90% mistrust politicians to act in the interests of the people and just 5% are satisfied that the political system works well.

Vote flow: Agitated Activists




Hopeful Left

The Hopeful Left is notable for its relative political optimism in an overall politically pessimistic landscape: 50% are satisfied that the political system works well. They are the core of current Labour support, with a considerable chunk having remained with the party through both the Corbyn and Starmer periods, although this segment has also appeared to opt for the Liberal Democrats in 2024, likely as a consequence of anti-Conservative tactical voting. The steady rise in support of the Green party from

this segment is something to watch.

The Hopeful Left are significantly more politically active than the two right-wing anti-Reform segments, though not as active as the Agitated Activists – 45% have signed a petition, 58% have discussed politics with friends, family and colleagues. They are also more likely than average to vote tactically, with a mean of 78%. Similarly to the Agitated Activists, there is distinctly lower willingness to vote Conservative, even tactically (59%).

Vote flow: Hopeful Left



Political mobilisation by segment (continued)


Pragmatic Progressives

This younger-leaning segment (many of whom were too young to vote in 2019) shows a growing interest in non-Labour parties of the left, with a core SNP and Plaid Cymru vote and higher support for the Greens and Liberal Democrats. This segment is the second most likely to be willing to vote tactically for parties that would keep Reform UK out, with an average of 80% across all parties.

As with the other left-wing anti-Reform segments, willingness to vote for the Conservatives to stop Reform is lower at just 58%.

This segment leans towards political pessimism but lacks the intense radicalism of the Agitated Activists: for example, just 11% actively disagree that political change is better when it happens slowly but surely, not rapidly on a major scale.

Vote flow: Pragmatic Progressives




Comfortable Moderates

This segment displays the biggest shift in political preferences, reflecting the anti-Conservative sentiment of the 2024 General Election which meant that Labour was temporarily their most popular party. That election aside, the Comfortable Moderates are actually the least likely of any of the segments to have switched their party preference – omitting members who were too young or abstained, two thirds (67%) of this segment still intend to vote for the same party they opted for in 2019 and 2024. This makes the Comfortable Moderates a truly mixed

segment; despite appearing most similar in attitudes to the average Conservative party voter, there are clearly loyal voters of other colours who might not associate themselves with that party.

This segment has an average likelihood of voting, with a mean score of 8.5 (anti-Reform average 8.6) and lots of non-voter and undecided voters. Alongside the Disaffected Right, they are much less likely to vote tactically, with a mean of 64% across all parties and lower scores for the Green Party and SNP. One in four (26%) who were eligible to vote in the 2016 EU referendum voted Leave.

Vote flow: Comfortable Moderates



Political mobilisation by segment (continued)


Disaffected Right


The Disaffected Right is the least likely to indicate certainty to vote in a General Election, with a mean score of 8.00 compared to a sample-wide average of 8.6. They reflect a disappointment and pessimism with politics that lacks the engagement and slightly radical edge of the Agitated Activists: just 15% are satisfied that the political system works well, but they are less likely than other segments to have participated in non-electoral political engagement

like protesting, signing petitions or donating to a political party.

This segment has the highest proportion of 2016 Leave voters, at 44% of those who were eligible to vote and can remember voting for a side (note that this is still lower than the actual result of 52%). They are considerably less willing to vote tactically to stop Reform, with an average of 57% across all parties, dropping to just 50% for the Greens and Labour.

Vote flow: Disaffected Right



Disaffected Right: financial experience vs. concerns about Reform's potential economic performance**Why don't the Disaffected Right support Reform UK?**

The Disaffected Right segment seems unusual compared to the other anti-Reform segments in that it seems to share more overlap with some Reform voters in terms of both identity and beliefs. Digging into key differences between the Disaffected Right and voters who would be happy with a Reform government ("pro-Reform voters") reveals the Disaffected Right's profound mistrust of Reform's ability to deliver, possibly linked to a distaste for Nigel Farage as a politician.

Members of this segment are significantly more likely than other anti-Reform voters to be in social housing, post-industrial areas, lower-paid work and feel financially precarious. Interestingly, these precarious circumstances are exactly what attracts some voters to Reform, and the average Disaffected Right voter is not that misaligned from the average Reform voter on the economy – but a feeling of scepticism and low institutional trust acts as a barrier for the Disaffected Right.

Members of the Disaffected Right are also more likely to select cost of living, inflation and financial markets as an area that concerns them about Reform (42% vs anti-Reform average of 35%). Digging within the segment, there is a clear correlation between levels of concern with a potential Reform government's economic performance and personal experiences of financial strain: precarity is breeding pessimism.







There also seems to be a "hygiene factor" that keeps these anti-immigration voters away from Reform: just 6% of the Disaffected Right think that Reform's views legitimately fall within normal political debate, with the most popular option being that Reform's views are generally too extreme (56%). Part of this appears to be associated with Nigel Farage. Just 4% of the Disaffected Right have a positive view of Nigel

Farage, compared to 83% of pro-Reform voters. Even if they like some of Reform's positions, the people and the rhetoric used to express them might be enough of a deterrent to keep the Disaffected Right away.

Plotting six potential Reform policies on a matrix of likelihood vs. approval, we can see that the Disaffected Right are unique amongst anti-Reform voters in approving of increased deportations, and being on the fence about shifting away from renewables and towards more oil and gas. However, comparing them to pro-Reform voters, we can see that they consistently have lower disapproval across all policies. Crucially, they also have a lower net likelihood score on all policies than both pro-Reform voters and the GB population as a whole. They appear to be sceptical that anything, whether they approve of it or not, will actually be implemented. The point of difference between them and Reform voters is a lack of belief that change is possible, and this anti-institutional belief is likely influenced by their material circumstances.

The Disaffected Right disapproves of many Reform policies, and is sceptical that they will deliver

■ GB population ■ Pro-Reform voters ■ Anti-Reform voters ■ Disaffected Right



Harnessing the anti-Reform coalition

Mobilising voters

A window of mobilisation appears before an election when there should be:

1. A case made for Reform UK as a legitimate threat
2. Campaigners “laying down arms” to support the identified Reform challenger
3. Targeted voter engagement and turnout programmes using the issues that have the strongest influence.

Issue-based campaigning is vital for parts one and three of the above, although non-partisan organisations might only be able to engage in the third part. Rather than bringing new topics to voters, we meet them where they are already worried and direct them towards solutions they can get behind. That said, strategically mobilising an anti-Reform voter coalition is more complicated, requiring a high volume of participation and agreement on the best course of action.

Political parties are best positioned to conduct voter persuasion, but defeating Reform is not their only priority. Parties continue to jostle for their own positive platforms as well as their places as primary contenders against Reform. It is neither necessary nor commendable to require political parties to narrow their focus so far away from a general election.

A tactical voting coalition need only last until polling day. Each election and contest will have its own unique factors, and it is too early to restrict anti-Reform voters to specific parties and topics for now. Below, we explore some of the issues that could deepen anti-Reform voters' concern and opposition.

Attitudes to Reform UK

Two thirds of anti-Reform voters believe that Reform's views are too extreme, with just 3% thinking the party's views fall legitimately within

normal debate. Reform leader Nigel Farage has incredibly low favourability, with an average of 91% of anti-Reform voters having a negative opinion of him.


Drilling down into what concerns anti-Reform voters about a potential Reform government, what is most striking is that immigration and asylum, Reform's most controversial position, is only voters' fourth highest concern (as a proportion of respondents who selected it as one of their top three concerns). This is because the Comfortable Moderates and Disaffected Right are not as concerned about Reform's immigration policy as the more left-wing segments. The three highest concerns of anti-Reform voters as a whole are the prospect of Nigel Farage as Prime Minister (51%); NHS, health and social care (51%) and the cost of living and inflation (35%).

However, there is some variation by segment. Agitated Activists are significantly more likely to be concerned about immigration and asylum policy (48%), whilst the Disaffected Right are more concerned than other segments about the impact on the cost of living and inflation (42%). Energy, climate and environmental policy are more likely to be selected by the Hopeful Left (33%) and Agitated Activists (29%), although they are lower overall priorities.

We also looked at anti-Reform voters' support or opposition to a number of potential Reform policies. The most opposed policy across all segments is closer political alignment with the USA alongside weaker ties to Europe. The anti-Reform voter base is significantly more likely to have voted Remain in the 2016 EU referendum, and also has a negative view of Donald Trump, so this is somewhat unsurprising. This policy also has the lowest approval amongst the GB population as a whole. Nigel Farage's links to Donald Trump and the MAGA movement could be a serious threat to Reform's success.

Thinking about Reform UK, which statement comes closest to your view?


- Reform UK's views are generally too extreme for normal political debate
- Reform UK's views are a mix of mainstream positions and more extreme views
- Reform UK's views legitimately fall within normal political debate
- Don't know



Approval/opposition to potential Reform policies

Here are some policies which some people have claimed a Reform UK government would introduce if they win the next general election. Please tell us how you would feel if the following policies were implemented by Reform UK in government.

● Approve ● Oppose



The most polarising policies, with the biggest net support differences across the segments, are: reduced welfare spending to support tax cuts, the increased deportation of immigrants, and shifting energy production away from renewables towards oil and gas exploration. These broadly reflect the leftward slant of around half of anti-Reform voters, with the Comfortable Moderates and Disaffected Right more in step with the average for the rest of the UK.

Immigration and asylum is Reform's flagship policy area, and the issue on which it is attracting much of its vote. However, our data indicates that there might be other, more fruitful areas for persuasion of anti-Reform voters. These might be less likely to backfire on anti-Reform voters with culturally right-of-centre attitudes. The unpopularity of Farage and the risk a Reform government poses to both the national economy and individual household budgets are both persuasive to voters.

Issues for targeting anti-Reform voters

Anti-Reform voters can be targeted both reactively, through encouraging opposition to Reform UK, and proactively, through channeling support towards any political party that is standing against Reform or a wider notion of good faith politics that excludes the far right. Although dislike of Farage and Reform are the lowest common denominator across the Reform coalition, a campaign of negativity will not be enough to defeat Reform because it will not engage frustrated voters, particularly those who already think electoral politics is broken and untrustworthy.

An important lesson from the 2016 EU referendum is that developing opposition is insufficient for guaranteeing a result. We need strategic anti-Reform turnout to flow from anti-Reform sentiment. It will be crucial to reach potential tactical voters on the issues that matter to them, both in terms of how their concerns are threatened by Reform and how there are positive, hopeful solutions.

The cost of living consideration

A potential obstacle to any issue's ability to garner support from UK voters is the primacy of the cost of living. Critics of climate action, including Reform UK, argue that renewables will raise energy costs and bills, that international action draws away from our domestic budget, and that emissions targets threaten industrial jobs. Critics of more open immigration policy allege that immigrants draw more from the system than they contribute, putting a strain on existing resources.

The Pragmatic Progressives and the Hopeful Left segments illustrate how cost of living concerns impact otherwise sympathetic progressive audiences: whilst the majority agree that climate change poses a threat to themselves and their family, 45% also agree that taking action on climate change will make the costs of everyday essentials more expensive. Similarly, whilst the majority agree that most immigrants make a positive contribution to the UK economy and society, a large proportion are also concerned that immigration to the UK has meant there is more pressure on public services like schools, hospitals and housing.


This tension – genuine underlying sympathy alongside practical cost concern – also plays out differently for climate and immigration.

Splitting respondents' answers to a practical question (will climate action make things more expensive for me?) based on whether they agree or disagree with a more conceptual question (does climate change threaten me and my family?), we find almost no difference between the two groups. Whether someone believes that climate change poses a threat or not has very little bearing on whether they also worry that climate action will raise the cost of essentials. Even among Agitated Activists, where belief that climate change is a threat is close to universal, around a third are still concerned about the cost of essentials.

This suggests that cost anxiety functions as an absolute concern, held largely independently of ideological belief: “do I believe the problem is real?” is a different question, for most people, to “will this policy cost me money?”

For the climate sector, there is a clear persuasion target. Even in segments where concern about climate is dominant, such as the Hopeful Left and Pragmatic Progressives, almost half still worry about the cost of action. Because this cost concern is separate from their underlying belief, it doesn't require shifting anyone's view on climate itself: inoculating already-sympathetic voters against the idea that climate action will raise costs removes a practical obstacle, without a harder ideological fight.


Economic concerns might mitigate or even override ideological concerns about climate and immigration



Belief that climate change is a threat does not significantly affect belief that climate action raises the costs of everyday essentials

Please say which statement you most agree with, even if you do not agree with either entirely:


Climate change poses a threat to the future well-being of me and my family ● Agree ● Disagree



Beliefs about whether immigrants contribute to the UK are strongly correlated with support for pro-immigration policies

Please say which statement you most agree with, even if you do not agree with either entirely:

Most immigrants make a positive contribution to the UK economy and society ● Agree ● Disagree



* Combines responses to two statements: 'Immigration should be allowed for anyone who wants to live and work in the UK but at moderate levels to manage numbers and impacts' and 'Immigration should be allowed for anyone who wants to live and work in the UK'.

By contrast, when it comes to immigration, we can see a clear correlation between respondents' beliefs about the impact of immigration on the economy and support for pro-immigration policy. Across every segment, those who agree that immigrants make a positive economic and social contribution to the UK are more likely to support an open or moderately open immigration policy. The same pattern also holds in reverse: within each segment, those who agree that immigration puts pressure on public services are less likely to support open immigration policies.

Immigration attitudes form a more coherent bloc, where values and concerns about resources move together, and both track closely with actual policy preference. This makes persuasion around immigration harder, as it requires shifting both ideological positions and practical objections.

Policy support

Looking at support for different progressive policies, none are uniformly popular amongst anti-Reform voters. The highest overall support is for a 2% wealth tax on assets worth £10m or more, with an anti-Reform average of 64%. The most uniform support is for a social media ban for under-16s, although overall support hovers around the 60% mark. Nationalising key infrastructure and utilities by bringing things like water and energy companies under state control is also popular amongst the left-leaning segments in the coalition.

A few potential narrative themes emerge from our research that would be useful for targeting different segments.

The UK on the international stage

We asked our sample to select the top three

countries they think pose the greatest threat to global stability. Anti-Reform voters were most likely to select Russia (75%), the USA (65%) and Israel (46%) as the biggest threats, with Iran (26%) and North Korea (25%) in fourth and fifth place.

There are some differences by segment: the Comfortable Moderates and Disaffected Right are more likely to be concerned about Iran than other segments, with around a third or each segment selecting it. It is worth noting that this poll was conducted after the beginning of escalating tensions and conflict between the USA and Iran: if the effects of the conflict and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz are felt more keenly, then this may be an important anti-Reform angle. Both Nigel Farage and Richard Tice were initially in favour of the UK joining the conflict and supporting the USA, but quickly U-turned on this.

Potential Reform links to Russia and the USA are the most promising across the anti-Reform coalition. Both countries' leaders have low net favourability: -85% for Vladimir Putin, -86% for Donald Trump. Reform UK has been criticised for links to both countries – Farage is an associate and keen supporter of Donald Trump, whilst ex-Reform Wales leader Nathan Gill was convicted for accepting bribes to make pro-Russian statements as a member of the European Parliament.

Two-thirds of anti-Reform voters (67%), including over half of the Comfortable Moderates and Disaffected Right segment, oppose closer political alignment to the USA alongside weaker ties to Europe. Even amongst the Brexit-supporting portions of the anti-Reform audience, there seems to be a feeling that a closer relationship with the USA is

not the answer.

The Agitated Activists are significantly more likely to see the USA and Israel as threats to global stability, indicating a higher prioritisation of Palestine as a global conflict. That said, Benjamin Netanyahu is unpopular across all segments, with a net approval rating of -68%. The government taking a much stronger stance against Israel is unlikely to have a negative impact on the Comfortable Moderates and Disaffected Right, but it could help Labour win back some support from the three left-wing segments.

A fairer taxation system


A wealth tax of 2% on wealth of over £10m was the most popular policy we tested, with a majority of even the more hostile segments on board: 60% of Comfortable Moderates and 72% of the Disaffected Right support it. However, we also find that around a third of the Comfortable Moderates and Disaffected Right agree that higher earners pay more than their fair share of tax. Support for economic retribution seems to require a clearly defined sense of which “high earners” are implicated. Wider “tax the rich” rhetoric might alienate the right wing of the coalition, as it moves away from specific sums that voters can be sure have no impact on them and towards a broader moral stance that is not common to the whole coalition.

The left wing of the anti-Reform coalition is much more supportive of redistribution, and therefore much more reachable. Just a fifth of the three more supportive segments (Agitated Activists, Hopeful Left, Pragmatic Progressives) do not support the policy, whereas the majority want to see a fairer system. There's a clear contrast with Reform UK's


Net policy support: Anti-Reform voters

Please say whether you support or oppose each of the following policies.

Anti-Reform voters Agitated Activists Hopeful Left Pragmatic Progressives Comfortable Moderates Disaffected Right



To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the economy?



economic policy – the previous commitment to increasing personal allowance has been dropped for cost reasons, but there has been no rowback on the “Britannia Card”, which would allow high earners to immigrate to the UK with some form of tax exemptions for a fee of £250,000 over ten years. This could leave the Treasury with a tax gap of billions.

Security for working people

The majority of the anti-Reform segments believe that most workers are poorly paid for the work they do (77% across the board), perhaps a reflection of wages failing to keep up with inflation over the long term. The Comfortable Moderates are the only outliers here, with 50% thinking jobs are poorly paid.

Both the Comfortable Moderates and the Disaffected Right differ from the rest of the anti-Reform coalition in their more conservative attitudes to the economy. However, workers' rights is an area where the two segments also differ from one another. 55% of the Disaffected Right agree that workers need stronger protections, significantly more than the 30% of the Comfortable Moderates who support stronger protections.

Reform's stated intention to repeal the Employment Rights Act is an obvious starting place to bring together the anti-Reform coalition. However, work beyond paid employment needs to be considered too. Members of the Disaffected Right are more likely than other segments and the GB average to be unemployed or retired and living on a state pension. They will not see direct benefit from the Employment Rights Act. The Disaffected Right's scepticism and pessimism about delivery might be an angle: if Reform repeals protections for renters

and workers, will they be able to replace them with anything functionally better, or will more people suffer?

As we approach the next general election, there will also be more examples of how stronger workers' rights protections have benefitted voters. The Pragmatic Progressives are perhaps the most fruitful segment to target with anti-Reform workers' rights narratives, because they are strongly supportive of workers having better protections, even if it increases costs for employers and businesses (81%). That they support this principle even in light of some financial drawback suggests strong ideological commitment from a segment that prizes economic security.

Protecting our public service safety nets


Preserving the NHS in its current form is a priority for around half of anti-Reform voters: 58% would oppose privatisation if implemented by a potential Reform government, and 52% oppose moving to an insurance-based model. Reform has distanced itself from previous comments made by Farage about supporting a French, insurance-based healthcare model and now confirms that it would maintain the NHS being free at the point of use.

Support for the NHS might be lower than expected because of the realities of running public services as opposed to ideological opposition to the principles. Opinion across anti-Reform voters is split more broadly on whether public services still offer good value for money: Agitated Activists (58%), Pragmatic Progressives (59%) and Disaffected Right (65%) all agree that they are no longer worth what we spend. Investment in public services without salient proof of impact risks leaving voters indifferent at great cost.

Beyond the left, most people need to understand emissions targets within an economic framework

Please say which statement you most agree with, even if you do not agree with either entirely

- Maintain ambitious targets for reducing emissions to tackle global climate change and support future industries, jobs and wellbeing
- Continue to have emissions targets, but these should be flexible to balance climate goals with economic stability, living costs and wider priorities
- Move away from strict emissions targets because they are unrealistic, too costly, or unlikely to make much difference to global climate change
- Don't know



Distinct from the NHS, but perhaps fuelling attitudes to public services, we can see concerns about welfare across the left/right split in the anti-Reform coalition. The right-leaning segments, the Comfortable Moderates and Disaffected Right, are significantly less likely to think that the majority of people who receive welfare support genuinely need it – 39% vs. 73% for the three left-leaning segments. Distinguishing ideological differences from practical compromises is crucial.

A wallet-friendly approach to emissions targets

Approval of a potential Reform government shifting to oil and gas and away from renewables is low, with an average of 20% approval and a maximum of 33% of the Disaffected Right.

As explored above, support for climate action is largely independent from the belief that tackling climate is expensive. When we combine these principles in a question about support for emissions targets with the economy as a constraining factor, we find that only the Agitated Activists, the smallest and most hardline left-wing segment, are more likely to support targets irrespective of impact on the economy. Half of the anti-Reform coalition (52%) favour continuing to pursue targets, but balancing this with economic priorities.

Importantly, there is very little support for scrapping the targets altogether (outside of the Disaffected Right, where it is the preferred option for 28%). Anti-Reform voters need reassurance of a wider, consistent programme of economic and environmental progress – the Green New Deal – in order to confidently support emissions targets.

Reform UK's plans to scrap the Net Zero targets to lead to bill savings have not been fruitful at the local level, nor will they succeed at the national level. Costs and economic factors are useful strings to pull on when communicating this uncertainty to the anti-Reform coalition – principles alone do not seem to be enough.

Defending multicultural Britain, irrespective of immigration

Rising ethnonationalist narratives threaten not only new arrivals but also people already settled in the UK. Most anti-Reform voters are comfortable mixing with other ethnicities (83% average) but are less confident that different cultures get along fine in the UK as a whole (69% average). This ties in with a broader perception that people feel better about their own lives and communities than they feel about the wider country.

The Disaffected Right in particular lack confidence in multiculturalism in addition to their concerns about immigration. 42% think that identifying with another culture makes someone less British (average anti-Reform 23%). Over a third think that ethnic minority communities, Muslims and asylum seekers are treated better than the average person in the UK. A clear-eyed defence of Britain with multiculturalism woven into its past and a non-negotiable part of its future is needed. This should sit distinct from questions around immigration and the economy.


Resistance to culture wars

On the culture war topics we tested, the anti-Reform segments indicate a desire to rise above reactionary

Anti-Reform segments on “culture war” topics

The following statements are about a range of cultural issues. To what extent do you agree or disagree with them?

Agree Disagree



gender, sexuality and reproductive discourse. However, amongst the Comfortable Moderates and Disaffected Right there is support for harsher punishments for criminals and mixed opinions on the legacy of the British Empire. The Disaffected Right and Comfortable Moderates are more likely to be divided on these issues, whereas the left-wing segments operate more coherently. The Comfortable Moderates are also significantly more likely to be on the fence, with many neither agreeing nor disagreeing with all statements.

What is notable is that abortion is uncontroversial amongst the segments, including the more right-wing segments. Reform has pledged to reverse measures that decriminalised abortions, meaning that women who terminate their own pregnancies could be prosecuted for doing so. This could be framed to anti-Reform voters as American import politics – it has no significant support in the coalition.

The pessimism dilemma

Perhaps the greatest obstacle to harnessing anti-Reform voters is their pessimism. On average, just a third of anti-Reform voters feel optimistic about the future – compared to a GB average of 41% – and 48% of voters who would be happy with a Reform government. Even amongst the segment with the highest institutional trust, the Hopeful Left, just 50% are more optimistic than pessimistic about the future.

Most anti-Reform voters think that younger generations will be worse off than them: an average of 62% across the coalition, rising to 84% of Agitated Activists. Whilst Reform voters might feel frustrated with how Britain is currently being run, they appear to believe that a transformation of fortunes is on the cards.

Pessimism need not be an obstacle as long as it does not depress turnout. Indeed, the Agitated Activists are still the most likely to vote and engage in wider politics despite mass dissatisfaction. However, Reform’s activation of non-voters might prove a spanner in the works. Whilst the majority of non-voters are younger, and mostly likely to support parties other than Reform, if the radical right is able to meaningfully energise voters not sufficiently captured by polling and modelling this could alter outcomes in a handful of seats. Non-voters did appear to turn out for Reform in the 2026 local elections, so whilst the potential additional turnout for Reform is small, it is not ignorable.

Politicians like Zack Polanski and Andy Burnham focus their communications on the idea of hope, but translating this burgeoning feeling into attitudinal shift and votes is a considerable but not insurmountable challenge. Burnham’s government acknowledges that some of the fruits of their policy interventions will only be felt keenly in the long term. He will also have to make the case that more immediate improvements will be in place by the next election.

Tactical voting at the next general election

Tactical voting

Anti-Reform tactical voting

The definition of a tactical vote is much disputed. Following Fisher, we define anti-Reform tactical voting as when a voter abandons their preferred party (if it is likely to come third or lower in a contest where Reform is one of the top two parties) to vote for the main challenger to Reform.¹

Tactical voting under first past the post (FPTP) and a multi-party system is extremely complicated. Knowing that a contest is close is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for tactical voting. Voters are required to understand both the national standing of the parties, as well as the political dynamics of their specific constituency. They must also be able to identify the challenger party, and be willing to vote for it. Willingness comes from a belief that the new party is sufficiently different from the party they are trying to stop and does not cross any personal “red lines”.

Some considerations for anti-Reform tactical voting in a UK general election

Extrinsic incentive to vote tactically

Local risk: is there a reasonable risk of Reform UK winning the constituency?

National risk: is there a reasonable risk of Reform UK winning a majority, or preventing another party from forming a majority?

Challenger viability: is there a clear challenger who is competitive enough to beat Reform in the constituency?

Intrinsic motivation to vote tactically

Challenger acceptability: are voters willing to support the challenger, and is the challenger distinct from Reform UK?

We asked our sample (excluding Reform voters) if they were willing to vote tactically for various parties if each party was the only one that could defeat Reform in a close contest in their constituency. Willingness to tactically vote hovers around the halfway mark for all non-Reform voters, with only minimal variation across parties. Anti-Reform voters are significantly more willing to vote tactically across the board, with around two-thirds being open to it, although preference for the Conservatives drops lower.

Of course, some voters will also be against tactical voting on principle, not due to a lack of understanding. But many appear to be willing to look beyond party preference if a case can be made that Reform is in a close race in their local area. Going back to the criteria for an anti-Reform tactical vote, the conditions for local and national risk appear to be met. The difficulty then lies with persuading voters that there is a clear course of action, and that their actions will be worthwhile.

The information environment and tactical voting

The prevalence of what appear to be three-way and four-way marginals in current MRP polls might incentivise anti-Reform tactical voting, as the breakdown of the mainstream parties or the splitting of progressive votes paves the way for Reform. Indeed, in our MRP poll we find 95 seats where Reform's projected vote has it beating or trailing another party by a margin of three percentage points or less. However, close contests can make tactical voting less likely to actually occur, as it is only possible when voters are clear on which party is best placed to support.

Without good quality information, tactical voting is likely to fail. Poor information can be:

- **Insufficient.** Voters are unable to engage in tactical coordination
- **Contradictory.** Multiple challengers render coordination outcomes uncertain
- **False.** Mistaken beliefs about a challenger mean that votes are coordinated, but unsuccessfully.

Sometimes, as a contest date approaches, a clear challenger emerges. This might be due to differences in campaign quality, local endorsements, national factors or media and social media narratives. All of these require consistent and credible information to be delivered to voters.


Many factors contribute to an information-rich environment: MRP and constituency polls are an important source of information for political parties and non-party campaigners alike. However, few voters tend to engage with multiple polls and track their progress over time. There is also the influence of local champions, individuals or organisations; local candidate strength, such as public prominence and cross-party favourability; strength of local campaigning like canvassing and leaflets.

Then there is the question of tactical voting tools and recommenders. These could focus on specific party outcomes (uniting the left or right, stopping

Non-Reform voters' tactical voting preferences are uniform; anti-Reform voters are more willing to vote tactically with a preference for parties on the left

Imagine there was a close election in your constituency between Reform UK and the party below. In that case, would you be willing to vote for this party to stop Reform UK from winning?

■ GB population (excluding Reform voters) ■ Anti-Reform voters



Reform or ending Labour's incumbency) or on specific issues. Whilst millions of voters consulted tactical voting sites at the 2024 general election, there is a lack of evidence to show whether these influenced their votes – and voters themselves might not know, given that many are exposed to a high volume of conflicting information in the run up to an election.

First past the post and voting blocs

The FPTP system has historically encouraged parties to build broad, plural coalitions in order to achieve seat outcomes that mirror their national vote share. This traditionally ends up favouring a two-party system.²

FPTP offers voters the protection of a quick and convenient way to “throw the rascals out” if a party's performance in government is unsatisfactory: mass tactical voting for the other main party in the system.³ We saw this in 2024, with Conservative abstentions and tactical votes for Labour. Now, under the fragmentation of the two-party system, “throwing the rascals out” could easily result in outcomes that are even less favourable than the current government. In other words, Green or Liberal Democrat voters might be tempted to throw the Labour government out, but know they would be worse off with a Reform government.

Historically, FPTP has benefitted larger parties with wider voter bases and posed a challenge for smaller parties who can struggle to gain seats even

as they command a reasonable percentage of the national vote. However, Reform has now rapidly grown from a struggling party to a dominant one. It is unsurprising that Nigel Farage has changed his position on electoral reform to wanting to remain with the current system. FPTP was a blocker, now it is an enabler.

Voters in the UK are broadly shifting party allegiances between left and right wing blocs, but not between them. However, this movement is affecting seat outcomes. Under proportional representation systems, voters can shift in blocs without inadvertently advancing the other bloc. Under FPTP, coordination across parties is needed across seats to ensure that one bloc splitting does not create an opening for the other.

Fisher argues that half of Reform seats won in the 2026 local elections could have been avoided with the coordination of progressive party votes.⁴ Tactical coordination would benefit the left more than the right if it was enacted – but there are multiple obstacles.

The view from recent by-elections

In by-elections there tends to be a richer, more focussed information environment, due to the standalone nature of the contest. There are often higher levels of local campaigning, media attention, debates and hustings, and even constituency polls conducted in some cases.

■ **Runcorn and Helsby, May 2025.** Labour was the only viable challenger to Reform, but ended up losing by just six votes. This by-election was concurrent with local elections where Reform gained many seats, so there was less of an established sense of local and national risk. Interestingly, the Conservative vote halved, with polling returns suggesting that some more affluent conservatives opted for Labour to stop Reform. However a lack of motivation for 2024 Labour voters to remain loyal, attributed to the government's cuts to winter fuel payments amongst other issues, clinched the contest for Reform.

■ **Hamilton, Larkhall and Stonehouse, June 2025.** A case of anti-Reform jeopardy, this Scottish Parliament by-election was won by Labour on 32% of the vote, with the SNP and Reform on 29% and 26% respectively. Both Labour and the SNP presented themselves as the anti-Reform challenger, with voters mobilised by a racist Reform advertisement targeting Scottish Labour leader Anas Sarwar and the neo-Nazi group Patriotic Alternative campaigning for Reform. Ultimately, there was no clear tactical voting pathway and anti-Reform votes appear to be divided.

■ **Caerphilly, October 2025.** Perhaps the clearest example of anti-Reform tactical voting, this time in a Welsh Senedd constituency: Plaid Cymru won with 47% of the vote, with the vote shares for Conservatives, Liberal Democrats and Greens all 2% or less. Labour's main obstacle was challenger viability, with a feeling that the party's political position was fragile in Wales as a whole and also the seat, after some disagreement on candidate selection. Plaid Cymru positioned themselves both positively and as the party best-positioned to take on Reform.

■ **Gorton and Denton, February 2026.** There was little clarity about whether Labour or the Greens were the best-placed challengers to stop Reform, and both parties angled for themselves as most viable. The Green party eventually won with a larger-than-expected majority of 4,402 votes after a fraught and often confusing contest. Tactical voting websites largely backed the Greens, but some voters who wanted to keep Reform out were unable to vote tactically due to a lack of clear evidence. Labour additionally suffered from a lack of voter enthusiasm due to the blocking of Andy Burnham from standing, wider government policy positions and rhetoric, and perceived complacency at presenting themselves as the only party to stop Reform.

■ **Arbroath and Broughty Ferry, June 2026.** There is no evidence of tactical voting at this by-election, which was won comfortably by the SNP as predicted, on a low turnout of just 31%.

■ **Aberdeen South, June 2026.** Reform's role in this by-election was more as an agitator than as a viable option, with the Conservatives comfortably winning the contest with 50% of the vote, against 29% for the SNP who previously held the seat. Whilst there may have been tactical voting from voters keen to punish the SNP, there is no evidence of anti-Reform tactical voting.

■ **Makerfield, June 2026.** This by-election was imbued with national risk following the selection of Andy Burnham as Labour candidate in a seat that would have otherwise been considered a safe target for Reform. There is strong evidence of anti-Reform tactical voting from Conservative, Liberal Democrat and Green voters who abandoned their parties of choice to back Labour. Burnham's acceptability as a challenger and the national significance of the result led to higher turnout from voters who might have stayed at home for the local elections the month prior, where Reform swept the floor. After a tense contest which also featured far-right party Restore Britain eating into Reform's support, Burnham and Labour won comfortably with 55% of the vote.

■ **Clacton, August 2026.** The 9,455 votes won by Count Binface are strong evidence of anti-Reform voting. With 27% of total votes cast, Binface's performance was the best ever by a comedy candidate. Farage still won his self-triggered contest with an increased number of votes compared to the 2024 General Election, but this happened in highly unusual circumstances with no other mainstream parties standing: whilst driven by anti-Farage sentiment, voters did not have to abandon their parties of preference to vote for Binface.

Unfortunately, tactical voting advice offered by political parties across the board has often been dubious – 'only X can win here' – and is not always primarily aimed towards beating Reform, even if it claims to be. There is very little evidence of tactical coordination at the 2026 local elections, despite many parties using literature to imply that their votes could stop Labour or Reform.



There is a limit to which increasingly cynical voters will accept parties claiming to be the ones to beat Reform without seeing results. The belief that a party can stop Reform is hugely powerful to anti-Reform voters, but parties risk abusing this and discrediting it. Like the boy who cried wolf, dodgy data on leaflets and 'it's now or never' could undermine public trust in tactical voting if overused before the next general election. More credible messengers could be important in coordinating local voters to participate.




Tactical voting by segment

With seat projections so uncertain, anti-Reform tactical votes could add some confidence to the picture. As explored above, it is not straightforward to incorporate tactical voting predictions into seat projections at present, as the incidence and success of coordination is so uncertain.

However, looking at whether there is a general willingness for anti-Reform voters to vote tactically, we can see that more than two thirds of the three left-wing segments are particularly willing to vote for any party, apart from the Conservatives.

If even a proportion of members of each segment voted tactically, this could have a sizable impact on seat outcomes. The segments vary considerably by size, so the three more left-wing segments and two more right-wing segments represent about 50% each of the coalition. However, the segments are also differently distributed across different seats in the UK, meaning that seats with higher proportions of Disaffected Right might be less likely to see anti-Reform tactical voting.





The current projections

Survation conducted a constituency MRP of voting intention for HOPE not hate between 22 and 27 July 2026. Unlike the anti-Reform polling sample which was collected before the Makerfield by-election and Keir Starmer's resignation, this MRP was conducted when Andy Burnham had been confirmed as leader of the Labour party and de-facto Prime Minister.

Fragile Reform victories

The poll found that if a general election were held during those dates, there would be a hung parliament, with Reform the biggest party on 227 seats to Labour on 197 seats.

Looking beyond the headlines, we find that Reform is competitive in about 463 out of 650 seats. These are seats where Reform is either coming in first or second place, or where it is within 10% of the predicted winner. The 10% criterion accounts both for the margin of error of the projections, as well as the potential for Reform to be a close third or fourth in a highly marginal seat.

Campaigning in all of these seats will be hard for any organisation other than a political party: we will need to consolidate efforts in a handful of seats where the outcomes can be shifted. Some seats currently look like comfortable wins for Reform (e.g. 100 seats are projected to be won by Reform with a predicted margin of 15%+), but many are significantly tighter races, and worth fighting for.

We find 95 seats where Reform's projected vote has it beating or trailing another party by a margin of three percentage points or fewer. With a swing of just 6% or less needed to change the seat outcome, there is a high chance of tactical voting making a difference – if voters are able to coordinate around a single challenger party.

Anti-Reform jeopardy

As discussed above, the difficulty of having multiple contenders vying for a single seat under FPTP is that parties can win on a low proportion of the vote if the vote is split across three or more options.

Looking at where Reform is competitive, we find 199 seats where there is “**anti-Reform jeopardy**”: these are the seats where Reform is currently projected to win, but only because the anti-Reform vote is split between two or more challengers. This is based on current projected vote shares, so will be liable to change as we move through the electoral cycle.

We reflect anti-Reform jeopardy as a score that first filters for whether the vote share of the top two challengers exceeds that of Reform; then scores each seat based on how close the race is between Reform and the challenger, and how close the gap is between the two challengers. Higher scores reflect constituencies where Reform's lead is narrow and the anti-Reform vote is evenly divided between two challengers, such that a single, obvious challenger emerging could defeat Reform in an FPTP contest.

Looking at the ten seats with the highest jeopardy scores illustrates the variety of local and national political scenarios captured by this analysis. The most common anti-Reform split is between Labour and the Conservatives, as in Dunstable and Leighton Buzzard, Derbyshire Dales and Maidstone & Malling. However, several seats show different parties as challengers: the SNP in Berwickshire, Roxburgh and Selkirk; the Liberal Democrats in Torridge & Tavistock and Hinckley & Bosworth; Plaid Cymru in Rhondda and Ogmore. The identity of the two splitting challengers varies significantly by region and political tradition, meaning coordination efforts need to be tailored to the specific contest in each constituency.

Until there is an information environment that clearly signals one party as a challenger, these seats will remain up for grabs. Tactical voting is not possible without a clear contender to coordinate around, even if there are many voters in the constituency keen to avoid a Reform candidate winning.

Ten constituencies with the highest “anti-Reform jeopardy”

Constituency	First	Second	Third	% Anti-Reform voters
Dunstable and Leighton Buzzard	Reform 26.6%	Labour 25.2%	Cons 25%	51.3%
Maidstone and Malling	Reform 26.0%	Cons 25.4%	Labour 23.9%	49.2%
Torridge and Tavistock	Reform 25.6%	Lib Dems 23.7%	Cons 23.5%	48.6%
Aylesbury	Reform 24.8%	Labour 23.1%	Cons 21.9%	54.5%
Berwickshire, Roxburgh and Selkirk	Reform 27.0%	SNP 24.9%	Cons 23.5%	50.8%
Hinckley and Bosworth	Reform 27.8%	Lib Dems 25.8%	Cons 23.6%	47.0%
Derbyshire Dales	Reform 29.3%	Labour 26.5%	Cons 25.1%	47.9%
Bexleyheath and Crayford	Reform 31.2%	Cons 29.1%	Labour 26.2%	33.7%
Exmouth and Exeter East	Reform 25.3%	Cons 24.2%	Labour 19.7%	42.3%
Rhondda and Ogmore	Reform 27.9%	Labour 25.6%	Plaid Cymru 22.2%	42.0%

NOTES:

1. Fisher, 2024. Prospects for tactical voting at the 2024 general election, UK in a Changing Europe (<https://ukandeu.ac.uk/prospects-for-tactical-voting-at-the-2024-general-election/>)
2. Duverger, 1951. Les Partis Politiques
3. Quinn, 2025. Party fragmentation and problems of accountability in the British general election of 2024, Parliamentary Affairs (<https://academic.oup.com/pa/article/79/1/71/8117011>)
4. Fisher, 2026. Tactical voting at the local and devolved elections 2025, LSE British Politics (<https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/tactical-voting-at-the-local-and-devolved-elections-2026/>)

Conclusion

The subject of this research is a somewhat slippery thing: there is no one issue or party around which all anti-Reform voters will cohere. Instead, they are linked by fear or scepticism of Reform, whose prospects, personnel and policies are themselves often in flux.

And yet, examining the attitudes and priorities of voters who could form an opposition to Reform has the potential to be fruitful. There are so many seats whose outcome is uncertain, and with Reform and Farage struggling, Reform victory is far from inevitable.

By looking at a target audience that expands beyond the usual sub-groups of “progressives” or “moveable middle” we can see the full expanse of the electoral picture. It is widely acknowledged that we are living in an era of political volatility, both in terms of parties themselves and voters’ loyalties.

Tactical coordination is complicated and fragile, but an anti-Reform coalition only needs to briefly exist before polling day to reshape the nation. Forming an opposition in one seat might mean convincing a handful of voters to strengthen a tiny margin, and in another seat persuading a larger number of voters to remove the possibility of anti-Reform jeopardy and vote tactically en masse.

The work to begin now is not selecting the one issue or one party that can reach anti-Reform voters – that will come much closer to an election date. Rather, we should be exploring how different angles of the ecosystem can play their part in building anti-Reform disapproval, and converting this into productive electoral dissent.

There are broadly three groups we think will benefit from these findings:

Party political campaigners

Though parties will have additional priorities beyond preventing a Reform win, campaigns should avoid misusing the language or logic of tactical voting. These can take the form of claims that “only our party can win here” or deceptive bar charts, which could deepen anti-Reform voter pessimism and scepticism and compromise future tactical coordination efforts.

It might prove more constructive to explore the priorities and geographic bases of relevant anti-Reform segments in order to genuinely reach tactical voters.

Non-party organisations interested in voter persuasion

The smartest operators will be aiming for a “sweet spot” campaign: how do they capture anti-Reform sentiment in that particular moment in political culture, and how do they do it in a broad-based way that reaches target voters in target seats?

Gaining a deeper understanding of which voters are most likely to tactically vote, and how to target them, is the next step to achieving this. Developing relationships of trust with these voters – not calling on them more than is strictly necessary, and having no ulterior motive beyond what is presented – could be key to preparing for the next general election.

It will also be helpful to continue testing different issues with different segments of the anti-Reform audiences. Even within issues, framing could impact the effectiveness of the delivery.

Politically neutral organisations doing issue-based or place-based work

For anyone interested in resisting the rise of the far right, there are ways to connect local or national issues to the potential implications of a Reform government. The anti-Reform segmentation demonstrates the sheer range of attitudes of people who could support this work, being wider allies to the system even if they are not being directed towards electoral coordination. We should continue to explore the priorities and persuadable issues for all voters.

This research will closely inform how HOPE not hate’s resists the rise of the radical right. There are many decisions still to be made, including on tactical voting recommendations. We look forward to continuing this important work.

Appendix 1: Methodology

National sample

Polling was conducted by Focaldata on behalf of HOPE not hate. This sample comprises 2,634 adults in Great Britain, with fieldwork between 20th May and 1st June 2026. Weights have been applied using census data on gender, age, education, ethnicity, region and results of the 2024 General Election to enable the sample to be nationally representative of Great Britain.

Anti-Reform sample

This sample comprises 8,617 adults in Great Britain who say they would feel unhappy (very unhappy or fairly unhappy) if Reform UK were to form the next government. Participants were surveyed by Focaldata between 20th May and 10th June 2026, preceding both the Makerfield by-election and Keir Starmer's resignation as Prime Minister. Anti-Reform participants from the nationally representative sample are included in the anti-

Reform sample as the two polls were conducted simultaneously.

Factor analysis

Focaldata conducted a multi-dimensional factor analysis to identify common themes between questions – for each theme, a set of questions was collapsed into a single index that captures the underlying attitudes within that theme. Table 1 lists the five factors and the four questions that comprise each one.

Respondents were scored on each factor and then clustered into five segment groups using Gaussian Mixture Modelling, which groups people sharing similar attitudes. It was privileged over other means because it allows for segments to be of different sizes and cluster shapes. Alternative solutions with four and six segments were rejected because they lacked explanatory value.

Table 1. Factor variable questions

	Question 1	Question 2	Question 3	Question 4
Multiculturalism	Agree: I am comfortable mixing with people of other ethnicities, religions and backgrounds in my local area	Disagree: If someone strongly identifies with another culture or nationality, that makes them less British	Agree: In most cases, people from different cultures get along fine in the UK	Agree: Most immigrants make a positive contribution to the UK economy and society
Social Justice	Treated worse than average: Muslim communities in the UK	Treated worse than average: People with disabilities in the UK	Treated worse than average: People with disabilities in the UK	Treated worse than average: People applying for asylum in the UK
Environmentalism	Agree: Climate change poses a threat to the future well-being of me and my family	Agree: I wouldn't mind making lifestyle changes to reduce my environmental footprint, like eating less meat	Agree: The UK should play a leading role in tackling climate change globally	Agree: Preserving the British countryside and natural landscapes should be a national priority
Institutional Trust	Trust: Politicians to act in the interests of the people	Trust: The mainstream media to report political issues in a balanced way	Trust: The police to keep communities safe and free from crime	Agree: I am satisfied the political system works well in the UK
Economic Justice	Support: Introducing a wealth tax of 2% on wealth above £10 million	Support: Nationalising key national infrastructure and utilities by bringing things like water and energy companies under state control	Agree: Workers in the UK need stronger protections, even if it increases costs for employers and businesses	Agree: Many jobs in the UK are poorly paid for the work people do

Confirmatory factor analysis on national sample

To provide the comparison between the anti-Reform segmentation and the nationally representative sample (including different party voter bases), a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted on the nat-rep sample which uses a model derived from the original anti-Reform sample factor analysis and predicts factor scores for each respondent.

To be able to compare the nat-rep and anti-Reform samples, the nat-rep factor scores were standardised using the anti-Reform sample's mean and spread, so that the origin point reflects the mean for the anti-Reform sample and positive or negative values show whether the sample in question (e.g. nat-rep, Conservative, Comfortable Moderates) scores higher or lower than the average for anti-Reform voters.

Finally, both datasets were combined and re-weighted to national population targets, so that the progressive respondents are scaled to reflect their true share of the British public rather than being over-represented. Weighted average scores were then computed for each of the five segments and for the nat-rep sample as a whole, and plotted as points on a number line for each attitude dimension.

Voting intention MRP

Polling and modelling was conducted by Survation on behalf of HOPE not hate between 22nd and 27th July 2026. The sample comprised 10,014 adults living in England, Wales and Scotland and the data was collected by online interview. Responses were then analysed using Multilevel Regression and Poststratification modelling to estimate the vote share of each party in each constituency, with 95% credible intervals.

In order to assess voting intention, Survation first asked respondents, on a scale of 0-10, how likely they would be to vote if a general election were to take place tomorrow. Respondents were then presented with a list of national parties, as well as the option for “undecided” and “another party”. Undecided respondents were removed from the final sample. If a respondent selected another party, they were then presented with a list of smaller parties to select from.

Appendix 2: What's at stake

The prospect of Reform winning at the next general election has practical and cultural implications for the country. Reform would repeal legislation that is designed to protect immigrants, workers and renters; their full economic strategy is uncertain but balancing the budget would require the economy to miraculously bounce back after costly mass deportations; Reform's use of nativist and ethnonationalist language has contributed to far-right talking points being mainstreamed in politics, media and social media.

With a general election less than three years away, a minority or majority government led by Reform remains a probable outcome. The following risks of government and policy are based on public comments by figures in the Reform leadership and its wider intellectual and media ecosystem, including think tanks such as the Centre for a Better Britain, Cambridge Circus Research and Legatum.

Reform's governing agenda

There is a likelihood that Reform will try to centralise executive power. This could involve removing legal, institutional and international constraints on the government – processes like judicial review – which function as checks and balances. Reform positions this as restoration of the UK's democratic sovereignty, but it would effectively restrict the abilities of civil society, independent regulators and elected officials to hold the government to account.

In the wake of these changes, it would be very difficult for a future government to rebuild a functioning economic system and a tolerant culture with meaningful debate and dissent. Reform's flagship policy of ending the vast majority of immigration to the UK would have a profound impact on the country's economy. Its efforts to break down the welfare state would be incredibly difficult to reverse. The dismantling of legal, institutional and cultural norms in service of mass deportations would be significant. Reform's dismissal of the climate crisis would also have a seriously damaging impact, not just to the environment but also economically and reputationally.

Policy threats

The following policies could be implemented in the early days of a Reform government in order to enact the party's agenda:

- Rapidly appointing hundreds of new peers (up to 800) to the House of Lords in order to more easily pass legislation through the upper chamber;
- Withdrawing the UK from the European Convention on Human Rights;
- Disapplying the Refugee Convention, with a target of reducing spend on asylum support by 90% within one parliament;
- Creating an ICE-style "deportation command", reporting directly to the Office of the Prime Minister, with the responsibility of removing all residents without valid rights to remain in the UK;
- Ending indefinite leave to remain, with some as-yet specific undetermined exemptions, and the pathway from ILR to citizenship either closed altogether or lengthened;
- Reducing the budget for overseas aid to a maximum of 0.1% of gross national income (it is currently 0.5%, with current Labour government plans to reduce it to 0.3% to cover defence spending);
- Significantly reducing welfare spending, by as much as 20%, with tightened eligibility criteria and benefits strictly limited to UK nationals;
- Closing down GB Energy, the publicly owned energy investment company;
- Repealing current Net Zero legislation and extending the deadline for Net Zero emissions from 2030 to 2050;
- Issuing new licenses for oil and gas development in the North Sea and onshore fracking;
- Further restricting the right to protest, with potential new powers to arrest protesters and freeze funds of non-profit groups deemed to act "against national interests".

In addition to the possibilities listed above, there are large areas of policy where Reform's plans currently lack detail, such as defence, health and social care, and education. Reform's plans pose a significant risk to our society and the legitimate flow of political debate: opposing Reform is not just a progressive issue, but an issue for anyone who wants to preserve political pluralism.


Appendix 3: Campaigning Guide

The attitudinal segments vary in terms of their underlying demographics, economic security and political preferences. Interestingly, there is no significant ethnic or religious variation across the

different segments. This detailed breakdown might be helpful for potential campaign design or those trying to understand how the segments contrast with the UK population.


Age

18-34 35-54 55-65+



Gender


Male Female



Education

What is the highest level of education you have attained so far?


Degree level and above Below Degree level



Socioeconomic grade

Which of the following best describes the occupation of the main income earner in your household? The main income earner in the household may be you or someone else so please answer for the most relevant person. If you are now retired with a private pension, please state your previous occupation.


ABC1 C2D E



Financial experience

Thinking about the financial situation for you and your household, which of the following best describes your experience?


Desperate, cannot afford essentials
Worried, struggling to keep up
Getting by, but making cutbacks
Comfortable, able to save
Well off: enjoying luxuries and saving
Prefer not to say



Housing


Does your household own or rent the accommodation it occupies?

Owns Rents privately Rents from council Rent free




2024 general election vote

Talking with people about the UK general election on 4 July 2024, we have found that many didn't manage to vote. Did you manage to vote, and if you did, who did you vote for?



Current voting intention


If there was a general election tomorrow which party would you vote for, or would you not vote?



2016 Brexit referendum vote

Excludes don't know, can't remember, too young and did not vote

If you remember back to the EU referendum in 2016, how did you vote?





HOPE not hate

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