HOPE not hate has undertaken polling to find out what the nation thinks about the conflict in Israel and Palestine, and how it is influencing attitudes towards Muslims and Islam domestically. This includes 1589 adults in December 2023 and 24,952 people in January 2024 and 1106 people in June 2024, all weighted to be nationally representative. We also draw from historic polling that tracks anti-Muslim sentiment over the last few years.
Over the last few decades there has been notable progress in attitudes towards diversity, reflective of improvements in race relations more broadly. Whilst this trend is due to a combination of intersecting factors, it is likely largely driven by two powerful, long term social trends: generational shifts in tolerant attitudes and rising education levels.
However, the extent of anti-Muslim sentiment in Britain remains stark. Our polling since 2018 has consistently found a third of the population maintain negative attitudes towards Muslims.
Many commentators argue that anti-Muslim prejudice has become so engrained and normalised in British society that is has passed, to use Baroness Warsi’s memorable phrase, the “dinner-table-test”. This is an important consideration when assessing how flashpoints such as the Israel-Palesitne conflict impact anti-Muslim sentiment, as any peak in hate crimes or dip in attitudes should be contextualised against an already high baseline.
In response to our polling from June 2024, 80% of respondents say they are following the events in Israel and Gaza, a 5% increase from when we first asked the question in December 2023. 24% say they sympathise more with the ‘Palestinian side’, an increase of 3% from our polling in December 2023. 23% sympathise with ‘both sides equally’, 22% with ‘neither side’ and 15% with the ‘Israeli side’.
In the UK context, the majority are concerned about the fallout that the conflict is having domestically and there is an overwhelming desire to overcome and heal divides forming. 64% are concerned about the increasing levels of hatred in the UK since the escalation of conflict, and most agree that this hatred has no place in our communities (75%). Looking forward, only 16% do not think that people in the UK with different views on the conflict can live together peacefully, indicating appetite and opportunities for cohesion initiatives.
Prior to the conflict, our polling shows that the level of anti-Muslim sentiment within society since 2019 was high, but relatively stable. The series of prolific terrorist attacks in 2017 saw anti-Muslim hatred peak, but successful Government intervention saw these figures reduce over the next 18-24 months. Since 2019, anti-Muslim attitudes remain high but relatively unchanged; on average, approximately one third of Britions harbour anti-Muslim sentiment. However, the events following the 7th October seem to be reversing this progress.
Police forces across the country monitored rising hate crimes between 7th October and 7th November 2023 compared to the same period in 2022.For example, West Yorkshire Police recorded that Islamophobic offences rose to 49 from 29, representing the biggest increase in such incidents. Similarly, Tell Mama reported a 335% spike in hate crimes from 7th October 2023 to 7th February 2024 compared to the same time period the previous year, a record high since the charity began in 2011.
Whilst hate crimes peaked immediately following 7th October and have since been decreasing, our public attitude polling shows a delayed onset to increased hostility towards Muslims. Demonstrably, perceptions of Islam as a “threat to British way of life” remained relatively unchanged in January 2024 from the previous year, seemingly negligibly affected by the “hate march” rhetoric we saw dominate headlines in late October 2023. This narrative perpetuated by some senior Government officials attempted to portray pro-Palestine solidarity demonstrations as violent and a threat to Jewish communities, making London a “no-go zone” for them.
However, between January 2024 and July 2024, this rose by 14%, with now almost half (44%) of the population viewing Islam as incompatible with British way of life.
Violence or conflict involving Muslims has historically always been a catalyst for escalating anti-Muslim hostility. For example, Tell Mama reported a 700% increase in hate crime reports the week following the Manchester Arena attack on 22nd May 2017, where 22 people were killed in a terrorist attack at an Ariana Grande concert. They also noted a marked shift towards more serious offline incidents such as physical attacks, threatening behaviour and abuse more generally. Our Fear and Hope report in 2017 also found that the attacks offset previous improvements in attitudes towards Muslims, with lasting impact on public perceptions. Notably, 42% of those polled said their suspicions of Muslims in Britain had increased as a result of recent terror attacks.
The events of 7th October and what has since followed is no exception to this. In order to decipher how the conflict has impacted public perceptions of Muslims, alongside broader questions about general attitudes, in June 2024 we also asked the following question: Thinking about ongoing conflict in the Middle East and the way British Muslims are responding to it, have your views of British Muslims been affected? For those who said their views had been affected, we asked: Would you say your views toward British Muslims have grown more positive or more negative? For those who said their views had not been affected, we asked: Would you say your views toward British Muslims are generally positive or negative, or are they neutral?
This allowed us to split the population into 5 groups:
Whilst the escalating anti-Muslim hostility since 7th October discussed prior is a huge concern, there remains a favourable majority of 72% for whom the conflict has not emboldened anti-Muslim sentiment; the ‘responsive progressives’, static progressives, and ‘neutrals’.
Within this group, 56% believe Muslims have successfully integrated into British society (versus 45% national average). These attitudes extend to support for multiculturalism more broadly; 57% believe that Britain is a successful multicultural society (versus 48% national average), and 54% agree that immigration has been good for Britain (versus 46% national average).
In contrast to this favourable majority, there persists a small yet active minority who are hostile towards Muslims. In our polling, 28% identified having negative views of Muslims in relation to the conflict. Worryingly, 64% of this group admitted that their attitude towards Muslims had grown more hostile as a result of the conflict; this translates to 18% of the whole population who are ‘responsive hostiles’. For this group, the conflict has hardened their hostility towards Muslims, presenting an opportunity to recommit to their anti-Muslim views with refreshed narratives. This presents the biggest threat; this group is not just hostile but reactive and volatile, and therefore more likely to be mobilised by inflammatory narratives surrounding flashpoints.
Crucially, we see this escalated hostility concentrated amongst the demographics most predisposed to anti-Muslim prejudice. Notably, men over the age of 65, educated to below degree level, who align themselves with right wing political parties or ideology, are twice as likely than the average to be ‘responsive hostiles’ (33% vs 18%).
These ‘responsive hostiles’ were already more likely to have negative attitudes towards Islam outside of the conflict context, and be sceptical of multiculturalism more broadly; polling from January 2023 shows those in these demographic groups were twice as likely to think that having a wide variety of backgrounds has undermined British culture (57% versus 31% national average) and that Islam is a threat to British values (58% versus 29% national average).
Thus whilst wider public attitudes towards Muslims have worsened since 7th October, this hostility is concentrated in demographics already most susceptible to anti-Muslim narratives. This highlights the dangers of failing to address the root causes of anti-Muslim sentiment. Preventing future events from triggering heightened hostility like we have seen in the fallout of 7th October requires interventions that target anti-Muslim hatred more broadly.
Initiatives that address anti-Muslim hatred must understand who makes up the ‘responsive hostiles’ to ensure that interventions are appropriately targeted. This is also important for understanding how and where reactions to the conflict may map onto pre-existing divisions, and so where there may be a need for broader, more holistic interventions that tackle the root causes of anti-Muslim sentiment beyond the specific conflict context.
Who are the ‘responsive hostiles’?
Initiatives that address anti-Muslim hatred must understand who makes up the ‘responsive hostiles’ to ensure that interventions are appropriately targeted. This is also important for understanding how and where reactions to the conflict may map onto pre-existing divisions, and so where there may be a need for broader, more holistic interventions that tackle the root causes of anti-Muslim sentiment beyond the specific conflict context.
Gender
Men are twice as likely to be part of the ‘responsive hostiles’ than women (25% versus 12%).
This is unsurprising. Many far right groups and radical right narratives evoke heavily gendered discourses that advocate for traditionally dominant and aggressive masculinity. As a result, we see men heavily over-represented in far right groups, and more likely in general to have hateful attitudes across a range of issues.
Anti-Muslim hatred is no exception; even prior to the conflict context, 34% of men believed Islam is incompatible with British way of life, compared to 25% of women.
Crucially, gender plays a role in not just the perpetrators but also the victims of anti-Muslim hatred. It is also important to note how gender intersects with multiple axis of oppression, and how anti-Muslim hatred largely plays out as a form of gender-based violence impacting Muslim women. In over 65% of the anti-Muslim cases recorded by Tell MAMA between 7 October 2023 and 7 February 2024, women were the target.
Age
Younger cohorts were much more likely to have had their attitudes towards British Muslims impacted, both positively and negatively by the conflict. Those aged 18-24 are almost twice as likely than those aged 65 and above to be in responsive groups (41% versus 24%).
There are a number of reasons for this, engagement with content on social media likely to be one. As both sides of the conflict accuse mainstream media of either misrepresenting or completely failing to document, many have turned to social media to both share information and express outrage as events unfold. Therefore as news coverage of the conflict tails off, those who are most active on social media, continue to engage with the discourse. Whilst 83% of the population use social media, research has shown that Gen Z are the most active in terms of the number of hours spent online.
Assessing the direction in which attitudes have changed, those in the top two age cohorts are more likely to have exacerbated negative sentiment than those in the younger cohorts, and therefore to be part of the ‘responsive hostiles’. This trend flips and becomes even more pronounced when assessing ‘responsive progressives.
This reflects the general generational shift towards liberalism, and the pre-existing acute generational divide in attitudes towards British Muslims. Prior to 7th October, those aged 65+ were already four times as likely to view Islam as a threat to British way of life than those aged 18-24 (43% versus 11%). Again, we see how the conflict has provided an opportunity for those already harbouring anti-Muslim sentiment to double down on their hostility.
Age and gender
However, the generational differences in the ‘responsive hostiles’ are not as pronounced as we might expect. Assessing both age and gender together highlights some important and interesting nuances.
Interestingly, the proportion of men in the ‘responsive hostile’ group is fairly consistent across all ages, ranging between 20-25%. Whilst there is a general tendency towards more liberal attitudes in younger generations, this only seems to be the case for women.
Thus the trend of younger women becoming more socially liberal contrasts heavily with the persistence of hateful attitudes in a notable proportion of young men. Young men aged 18-24 are almost three times as likely to be ‘responsive hostiles’ than young women (22% versus 8%). Comparatively, older men aged 65+ are only 7% more likely than older women.
This raises two important considerations. Firstly, that traditional perceptions of anti-Muslim hatred as a fading issue in younger ‘woke’ generations risks ignoring a notable and growing part of the problem. Secondly, this adds to a growing collection of data drawing attention to the deepening fractures in younger generations along gender lines, and the importance of considering the potential fallout of this in wider cohesion initiatives.
Aside: The results in this graph show the 45-54 age group as an anomaly to the observation about generational gender divides, where men are almost 5 times more likely than women to be ‘responsive hostiles’. This can be explained by the fact that only 7% of women in this age group reported having their attitudes affected at all, skewing the results to automatically be much lower than their male counterparts. 7% is surprisingly low, suggesting this group is notably disengaged from rhetoric surrounding the conflict and/or Muslims. There could be many reasons for this, including the fact that they spend less time online than younger cohorts, and are more likely to be in work and/or with younger children and therefore have less time to keep up with news than the older cohorts.
Race and religion
Asian and Black respondents are more likely than White respondents to be ‘responsive hostiles’.
This can partially be explained by considering the influence of relationships between ethnic minority and religious communities. Unfortunately, the sample size of our polling that digs into attitudes about the conflict specifically is too small to draw conclusions about ethnic and religious minority groups. However, our larger polling where these groups are weighted to be nationally representative indicates the presence of anti-Muslim sentiment within these communities.
For example, Buddhist, Jewish, Sikh and Hindu respondents were more likely than Christian respondents and respondents with no religion to believe the conspiracy theory that parts of Europe are under the control of Sharia Law and are ‘no-go’ zones for non-Muslims.
Just as the conflict in Israel and Palestine is feeding anti-Muslim hate in the UK, other international contexts and anti-Muslim politics also contribute to anti-Muslim sentiment domestically. Legacies of partition and the importing of interfaith tensions resulting from current and past geopolitical events in South Asia are just some explanations for the prevalence of anti-Muslim hate from ethnic minority respondents.
Widespread perceptions of anti-Muslim hate as predominantly an issue within white, non-religious or Christian communities risk neglecting a sizeable portion of the problem. Crucially, solutions that seek to address anti-Muslim hatred that either overlook or completely neglect to acknowledge its presense within other minority communities are limited in their ability to prompt widespread change.
Political leaning
In June 2024, we asked respondents who they intended to vote for in the General Election scheduled for 4th July 2024. Overall, those with right leaning political beliefs are twice as likely to be ‘responsive hostiles’ than those with left leaning political beliefs (27% versus 13%).
As this report will later explore, whilst anti-Muslim sentiment is present across the political spectrum, it has long been utilised and peddled by right wing politicians to appeal to right wing voters. The conflict in Israel and Palestine is another example of how around international events are narrated to fuel anti-Muslim sentiment domestically.
Education
Level of education is a fault line in anti-Muslim sentiment, although notably not as significant as other characteristics.
Level of education has a more notable impact on positive attitudes than negative attitudes. Those educated to degree level or above are twice as likely to be in the ‘responsive progressive’ group than those educated to below degree level (14% versus 7%).
This reflects pre-existing fault lines whereby having lower levels of education makes you more likely to adopt anti-Muslim sentiment, as well as discriminatory attitudes more broadly. Education has long been empirically identified as having a liberalising influence on attitudes by promoting egalitarian attitudes and heightened commitments to democratic norms of equality and tolerance.
Despite it being a relatively small proportion of society who are ‘responsive hostiles’, these exacerbated negative attitudes towards Muslims are impacting wider cohesion, and people seem to be conscious of this. 52% acknowledge that the conflict has worsened tensions between communities in the UK.
Perceptions of multiculturalism more broadly have also been notably impacted. Prior to October, the number of people who either directly opposed multiculturalism or believed it was failing was falling, reflective of the discernible progressive shift in attitudes and improvements in race relations more broadly. Since then however, this has risen, and continues to rise.
Our polling from December 2023 showed a 6% increase in scepticism to multiculturalism over the previous year. This trend has continued; today, there is even more consensus that multiculturalism isn’t working, up 12% in the last 6 months. Alongside this, there is heightened awareness of increasing tensions between different ethnic groups in the UK, from 53% in December 2023 to 60% in June 2024.
Exacerbated fault lines
This broader impact on cohesion and attitudes to multiculturalism can be explained by the fact that attitudes towards the British Muslims since 7th October map onto pre-existing fault lines in society, accentuating existing divides. The conflict is not just increasing tensions between the hostile groups and Muslims, but more broadly between the hostile groups and the favourable groups. This is feeding into a wider picture of escalating divergence around key socio-cultural issues.
Crucially, on the opposite end of the spectrum to the ‘responsive hostiles’ exist the ‘responsive progressives’. This group denotes the 9% of the population for whom the conflict has reinforced positive sentiment towards Muslims.
We have discussed above how men over 65 educated to below degree level, who align themselves with right wing political parties or ideology are overrepresented in the ‘responsive hostiles’.
In contrast to this, young women with degrees, who politically subscribe to left leaning parties are four times more likely to be part of the ‘responsive progressives’ (37% versus 9%). For them, the conflict has allowed them to recommit to their preexisting affiliation to more tolerant attitudes.
Crucially, we see both of these demographic groups at the heart of various culture wars across a broad range of issues, doubling down on their beliefs at every given opportunity. Subsequently, we see the conflict enhancing the divides that already exist within society, enhancing polarisation at either end. Their reactions to the conflict are influenced by pre-existing attitudes towards not just Muslims but tolerance and progressivism more broadly. Most worryingly, their doubling down on these attitudes in the context of the conflict is contributing to escalating division and polarisation within the UK that already exists across multiple issues. This indicates implications not just for the Muslim community at the receiving end of this hatred, but also for wider cohesion and divergence between both of these groups. Notably, both of these groups are less likely than the average to believe that those with different views on the conflict can live together peacefully.
However, promisingly, the demographic makeup of the broader favourable majority is generally reflective of wider society. Thus, despite entrenched views and enhanced polarisation at either end of the spectrum, there remains a diverse majority committed to peaceful coexistence within and between communities. This implies the likelihood of an overwhelmingly positive reception from this majority to Government interventions that stamp out hate and bridge divides.
The ‘neutrals’: Risks and opportunities
59% of the favourable majority have neutral, rather than positive, views about Muslims, making up approximately 40% of the wider population. Similarly, 42% of polling respondents answered ‘neither agree nor disagree’ or ‘don’t know’ when asked if pro-Palestine demonstrations were ‘hate marches’, and 45% answered the same when asked if pro-Palestine demonstrations supported Hamas.
This sizable portion of the population appears disengaged from discourse around the conflict. Regardless of whether this is intentional, due to lack of interest, or lack of exposure, this neutral group presents both opportunities and risks for cohesion.
Crucially, they could very easily be engaged by the wrong people, caught up by the emotive and inflammatory rhetoric by those seeking to use the conflict to spread anti-Muslim hatred.
Targeted interventions and positive messaging work with this group will not only prevent this, but could kickstart more long-term, sustainable change where they become mediators between the hostile and progressive groups.
There is undeniably a huge desire for improved relations, and ambition to stamp out hate. As laid out, there remains a favourable majority of the country who are concerned about the rising anti-Muslim sentiment coming from the hostile minority, and willing to engage with initiatives that heal divides.
Overwhelmingly, respondents agreed that anti-Muslim hate has no place in our communities (66%) and that it is wrong to blame an entire religion for the actions of a few extremists (63%). The hostile groups, both responsive and stable, are a clear minority; basic humanity and the human desire for social connection overrides the specific context of this conflict which otherwise is seen to drive people apart based on the ‘side’ they take.
However, there is a distinct lack of optimism, rooted in recognition that the ‘responsive hostile’ group is becoming increasingly emboldened, and divides are deepening. The number of people who believe those with different views on the conflict can co-exist peacefully has decreased, from 57% in December 2023 to 45% in June 2024. Similarly only 19% think that relationships between different communities will get better over the next few years, dropping by 10% over the last 6 months.
Despite this, there is a clear desire for interventions and leadership from above, and a willingness to engage in initiatives that seek to bridge divides. 70% want to see the Government take action to improve cohesion, and 61% specifically want to see more programmes of work that bring communities together.
There is a disjuncture between overwhelming public desire for solutions from the favourable majority, and perceptions of waning political will to implement them. There is a missed but still present opportunity for successful cohesion initiatives that addresses the fallout of the conflict, with positive reception and buy-in from a sizeable and diverse majority who want to heal divides.
Doubling down on division looks at anti-Muslim hatred in the UK since 7th October, and both the causes and impacts of it. Download the report today.
As we expose more activists involved in the anti-migrant campaign in Hampshire as having extensive links to the organised far right, it’s getting harder and…
