International events and, crucially, the political and media rhetoric that accompanies them, have historically been a catalyst for hardening domestic attitudes amongst those already predisposed to certain views. Events such as the Rushdie affair, the Gulf Wars, and the Iraq War have all had a polarising effect on public attitudes towards Muslims.
The escalation of conflict in Israel and Gaza has proven to be no exception to this. It has provided refreshed polarising narratives and the opportunity for people to reaffirm and recommit to existing values and mindsets.
But how does a conflict thousands of miles away trigger such intense repercussions in the UK, and what can the Government learn from how this has played out so far?
Narratives perpetuated by political leadership are crucial here. The last few years in particular have seen the Conservative party sliding to the right, with much of their messaging echoing the extreme rhetoric of organised far-right actors and groups as they attempt to appeal to an increasingly right wing group of supporters. Culture war arguments targeting ‘invasions’ of asylum seekers, the “misguided dogma of multiculturalism” and lefty ‘activist lawyers’ have become increasingly normalised and divisive.
Time and time again mainstream political figures have echoed far-right clash-of-civilisations rhetoric that condemns Islam and Muslims as culturally incompatible with, and subsequently a violent threat to, the ‘progressive’ Western world. This has long been the cornerstone to anti-Muslim ideology and underpins the link between instability in the Middle East and heightened Islamophobia in the UK. These narratives originated during the Iranian Revolution of 1979, where televised ‘Death to America’ chants kick started the ‘guilty by association’ fallacy used to implicate all Muslims worldwide as part of a violent monolith. The major catalyst however was 9/11, which institutionalised and preserved this trope through the War on Terror.
Unsurprisingly therefore, almost immediately after the conflict escalated in October, the political mainstream – both politicians and the media – jumped to propagate a narrative that lazily but dangerously draws from Islamaphobhic tropes.
Straight off the bat the then Home Secretary Suella Braverman villanised pro-Palestinian demonstrations as “hate marches”, in a gross and inflammatory mischaracterisation. Labour MP Zarah Sultana was accused by Conservative MP Andrew Percy of giving a “free pass to the terrorists” by calling for a ceasefire, and then asked by the Prime Minister Rishi Sunak to “call on Hamas and the Houthis to de-escalate the situation”, playing on an Islamophobic trope that, as a Muslim, Sultana not only supports Hamas but has ties with them. Later, Sunak claimed that “mob rule is replacing democratic rule” in the UK and that extremist groups “at home [are] trying to tear us apart”.
The media is pivotal in disseminating this fear towards incompatible and violent Muslims. Inflammatory headlines about the threat of “jihad on our streets” and a religious war that will “unite Muslims under one Islamic caliphate” mobilise fear that can exacerbate community tensions and hasten breakdown of community relations.
The Centre for Media Monitoring published a report in March 2024 detailing the shortcomings of the British Media’s output of the conflict. It found that not only were Israeli voices favoured over Palestinian voices, dehumanisation of Palestinians were often allowed on air with no considerable pushback, contributing to the legitimisation of anti-Muslim rhetoric. Furthermore, Palestinian symbols were overwhelmingly used to illustrate stories on anti-Semitism and there was widespread misrepresentation of pro-Palestine protests and protesters as inherently dangerous.
The concentration of these narratives in right wing press circles in particular further enhances polarisation. It is no surprise, for example, that those who get their news from the Daily Mail or GB news are more likely to think that Islam is a serious threat to Western civilisation.
It is no surprise that these media outlets are perpetuating anti-Muslim rhetoric given those in charge of them. Paul Marshall, for example, co-owner of GB news and recent winner of the bid to buy The Spectator has himself endorsed Islamophic, racist and homophobic content online.
Back in February, HOPE not hate revealed hateful social media activity from Marshall, concealed behind a private and anonymised Twitter account. This activity found him to be liking extreme anti-Muslim conspiracies, amongst other hateful content, endorsing tweets calling for mass-deportations and suggesting the UK’s “sizeable Islamic presence” makes a civil war imminent.
Worryingly, Marshall is also in the running to buy The Telegraph, which would set him to be among the most powerful media owners in the country. The influence this would afford him exacerbates fears about the increasing role that the right wing media would play in spreading anti-Muslim, far-right narratives.
Securitising dissent
Narratives about Islam and Muslims as antithetical to the values of the West have been frequently deployed to villainise, securitise and curb dissent about foreign policy in particular. The motives and identity of anti-war demonstrators in 2003 for example were routinely discredited within the discourse of ‘deviance’ and ‘incivility’, relegating their protests to the realm of disorder and violence much like the pro-Palestine ‘hate marches’ have been.
Situated against a backdrop of incremental erosion of democratic safeguards through laws such as the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 and the Public Order Act 2023, the political response to this situation is part of a broader trajectory of undermining scrutiny and silencing political opposition from particular actors.
In March 2024, Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities Michael Gove launched a new definition of extremism in response to “the pervasiveness of extremist ideologies in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Israel on 7 October”. Whilst a valid cause that should receive attention, many have viewed this to be an attempt to specifically clamp down on Palestinian solidarity and Muslim ‘mob rule’, and an opportunity to press forward with the recommendations from the Shawcross report, itself already criticised for its overt anti-Muslim framing.
Discriminatory definitions of extremism and how they feed into the Prevent system have long been documented and criticised as a tool to target and demonise Muslims and stifle their political agency. More than ever, we see (counter)extremism being used as a political tool guided by an ideological agenda, and not as a means of bringing genuine and long-term public security. The expansion of government and law enforcement powers to stifle legitimate political engagement is being used to specifically target Muslims and expressions of Palestinian solidarity.
This is problematic for a number of reasons. Broadly, the implementation of these policies further feeds into rhetoric about ‘violent’ Muslims in a chicken-and-egg loop as they ‘confirm’ and therefore justify anti-Muslim narratives.
Securitising Muslim dissent also stifles Muslim political agency through self-censorship as public engagement feels increasingly unsafe, an effect that is not only discriminatory but contradictory to values of a healthy, pluralistic democracy and raises serious wider concerns about the state of democracy.
This is also hugely counterintuitive and counterproductive to the aims of counter-extremism. Securitising dissent risks escalating fear and distrust of authorities, and Government refusal to engage with Muslim communities and organisations about their concerns regarding Prevent only compounds and escalates this further. The resulting perceptions of censorship and disenfranchisement is for many a precursor for extremism; it underpins the anti-politics movement and encourages people to seek out alternative forms of representation which makes them vulnerable to radicalisation. The impact on self-censorship also makes it so much harder to identify genuine risks of radicalisation, as people withdraw from engagement with authorities as it feels unsafe.
The UK’s Public Order Act (POA) lays out the ways in which people may be prosecuted for ‘stirring up hatred’ against religious groups.
An ongoing conversation in this space is the thresholds for which religious hate crimes can be persecuted (Part IIIA of the POA, added in 2006), specifically how and why it differs from the threshold for racial hate crimes (Part III of the POA). The problem comes down to the fact that the former is more restrictive and difficult to convict under; religious hatred requires proof of intent to stir up hatred, and does not include speech that is ‘insulting’.
Many of those who work in religious hate speech and law argue that the threshold for religious hatred should be lowered to match that of racial hatred, in order to avoid creating what has been described as a ‘hierarchy of hatred’.
However, there is valid concern that lowering the threshold risks blurring the boundaries between criticism and hatred, and criticism and legitimate debate of religion is something that must be upheld in healthy democracy. Indeed, conversations about hate speech are often approached as a dilemma of competing values, with free speech and individual autonomy variously pitted against dignity, equality and other notions of harm.
One potential solution to this balance could involve using the Rabat Plan of Action, published by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2012. The Rabat Plan sets out a clear, six-part test to ensure both vulnerable minority groups and freedom of expression are protected. Crucially, the Rabat Plan also acknowledges the importance of the wider socio-cultural context within which hate crimes occur. Subsequently, among the key factors proposed in the Rabat Plan of Action are the collective responsibility of public officials, religious and community leaders, the media and individuals to nurture social consciousness, tolerance, mutual respect, and intercultural dialogue.
Legislating for such a contextual and nuanced issue is difficult and often problematic. However, the Rabat Plan presents a missed opportunity for the Government to use clear, UN-backed guidance to strengthen the efficiency of its hate crime laws by considering how contextual nuance can be coded into legislation to strengthen protections for everyone.
A green light for anti-Muslim hate
The Conservative Party’s response to the conflict not only legitimised but actively encouraged widespread Islamophobia veiled behind the facade of security concerns. Assessing the views of the ‘responsive hostiles’, it is clear these narratives and policies have cut through and play a significant role in the heightened hatred. 65% of this group think those attending a pro-Palestine demonstration are supporting Hamas (versus 30% average), 59% think that the demonstrations are ‘hate marches’ (versus 28% average), and 61% think that pro-Palestine demonstrations are motivated by a hatred for Jews and a desire to see the destruction of Israel (versus 31% average).
Whilst important to stress that these views about British Muslims and pro-Palestine supporters are being adopted by a minority of the population, there are wider implications to consider. Worryingly, 63% of the public are concerned about the threat of an Islamist terror attack in the UK in the context of the ongoing conflict. Whilst divisive narratives may not be affecting widespread attitudes towards British Muslims in particular, they are clearly tapping into fears and perceptions of violence associated with Islam that do exist more broadly.
Roles and responsibilities of a new Government
Whilst it was a Conservative Government that pursued this anti-Muslim agenda in the post 7th October landscape, the drivers and consequences of this do not simply disappear with a change of Government.
Crucially, anti-Muslim hate is not only an issue of the political right. The left has also perpetuated dangerous Islamophobic stereotypes and policies that demonize and securitise Muslim communities. Under Tony Blaire and Gordon Brown, new Labour years were deeply hostile for Muslims. Indeed, it was this Government that pursued the War on Terror, arguably setting the narrative of Muslims as the “enemy within” and the blueprint for a securitised community.
Anti-Muslim hatred off the back of 7th October does not automatically end because the Conservatives are no longer in power. Labour must have a plan to address the fallout that the previous Government not only ignored but actively encouraged. This should include specific resources and interventions at the community level that seek to rebuild trust and cohesion in communities where anti-Muslim hate has thrived, repairing the relations that have broken down.
However, this will only be successful if Labour also commits to ensuring that its own party, as well as the political mainstream more broadly, is not an enemy of progress. Labour must make a concerted effort to ensure that it does not provoke, legitimise or even risk downplaying anti-Muslim sentiment. They must recognise the influence that the political mainstream has in setting the direction for public opinion and therefore both the risks and opportunities that reside here, seeking nuance that can and should underpin responsible and successful leadership and policy.
This should include clear standards and red lines for language and narratives that violate their responsibility to pursue community cohesion, with repercussions when they’re crossed, applicable to all levels of government officials. Similarly, Labour has a duty to address the consequences of the democratic backsliding pursued by their predecessors, and engage with the pro-Palestine movement as a legitimate form of democratic participation and protest.
Doubling down on division looks at anti-Muslim hatred in the UK since 7th October, and both the causes and impacts of it. Download the report today.
As we expose more activists involved in the anti-migrant campaign in Hampshire as having extensive links to the organised far right, it’s getting harder and…
